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What is the proper metaphysics of quantum mechanics? In this dissertation, I approach
the question from three different but related angles. First, I suggest that the quantum
state can be understood intrinsically as relations holding among regions in ordinary
space-time, from which we can recover the wave function uniquely up to an equivalence
class (by representation and uniqueness theorems). The intrinsic account eliminates
certain conventional elements (e.g. overall phase) in the representation of the quan-
tum state. It also dispenses with first-order quantification over mathematical objects,
which goes some way towards making the quantum world safe for a nominalistic meta-
physics suggested in Field (1980, 2016). Second, I argue that the fundamental space of
the quantum world is the low-dimensional physical space and not the high-dimensional
space isomorphic to the “configuration space.” My arguments are based on considera-
tions about dynamics, empirical adequacy, and symmetries of the quantum mechanics.
Third, I show that, when we consider quantum mechanics in a time-asymmetric universe
(with a large entropy gradient), we obtain new theoretical and conceptual possibilities.
In such a model, we can use the low-entropy boundary condition known as the Past
Hypothesis (Albert, 2000) to pin down a natural initial quantum state of the universe.
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However, the universal quantum state is not a pure state but a mixed state, represented
by a density matrix that is the normalized projection onto the Past Hypothesis sub-
space. This particular choice has interesting consequences for Humean supervenience,
statistical mechanical probabilities, and theoretical unity.
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Quantum mechanics (and its relativistic cousins) is the most successful physical theory
to date. Despite its empirical success, quantum mechanics presents many conceptual
and philosophical puzzles. The first problem is the “quantum measurement problem,”
according to which there is either a logical inconsistency or a fundamental ambiguity
in the axioms of measurement. As we have learnt from J. S. Bell, the measurement
problem is related to the second problem – the absence of a clear and satisfactory
physical ontology (in the standard presentation of textbook quantum mechanics).
Regarding the measurement problem, there has been much progress in the last
few decades. Physicists and philosophers have produced three classes of solutions: the
de-Broglie Bohm theory (BM), the Everettian theory (EQM), and the Ghirardi-Rimini-
Weber and Pearl theories (GRW / CSL).
Regarding the ontology problem, we have learnt much from the solutions to the
previous problem. BM postulates an ontology of particles in addition to the quantum
wave function, while the original versions of EQM and GRW / CSL postulate only the
wave function. However, far from settling the ontology problem, these theories raise
new philosophical questions:
1. What is the nature of the wave function?
2. If the wave function “lives on” a high-dimensional space, how does it relate to
3-dimensional macroscopic objects and what Bell calls “local beables?” What,
then, is the status of the 3-dimensional physical space?
3. Are local beables fundamental? Is the wave function fundamental?
My dissertation consists in three essays on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics
that attempt to make some progress on these questions.
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Chapter 1. The Intrinsic Structure of Quantum Mechanics
What is the nature of the wave function? There are two ways of pursuing this question:
1. What is the physical basis for the mathematics used for the wave function? Which
mathematical degrees of freedom of the wave function are physically genuine?
What is the metaphysical explanation for the merely mathematical or gauge de-
grees of freedom?
2. What kind of “thing” does the wave function represent? Does it represent a
physical field on the configuration space, something nomological, or a sui generis
entity in its own ontological category?
Chapter 1 addresses the first question. Chapters 2 and 3 bear on the second question.
In Chapter 1, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state. This account
contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic account lacks: (1) it
does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects such as complex numbers, (2) it is
independent of the usual arbitrary conventions in the wave function representation, and
(3) it explains why the quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom
(with the help of new representation and uniqueness theorems). Consequently, this
account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in Science Without Numbers (1980),
responds to David Malament’s long-standing impossibility conjecture (1982), and goes
towards a genuinely intrinsic and nominalistic account of quantum mechanics.
I also discuss how it bears on the debate about “wave function realism.” I suggest
that the intrinsic account provides a novel response, on behalf of those that take the
wave function to be some kind of physical field, to the objection (Maudlin, 2013) that
the field-interpretation of the wave function reifies too many gauge degrees of freedom.
Chapter 2. Our Fundamental Physical Space
Chapter 2 explores the ongoing debate about how our ordinary 3-dimensional space is
related to the 3N-dimensional configuration space on which the wave function is defined.
Which of the two spaces is our (more) fundamental physical space?
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I start by reviewing the debate between the 3N-Fundamentalists (wave function
realists) and the 3D-Fundamentalists (primitive ontologists). Instead of framing the
debate as putting different weights on different kinds of evidence, I shall evaluate them
on how they are overall supported by: (1) the dynamical structure of the quantum
theory, (2) our perceptual evidence of the 3D-space, and (3) mathematical symmetries
in the wave function. I show that the common arguments based on (1) and (2) are either
unsound or incomplete. Completing the arguments, it seems to me, renders the overall
considerations based on (1) and (2) roughly in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. A more
decisive argument, however, is found when we consider which view leads to a deeper
understanding of the physical world. In fact, given the deeper topological explanation
from the unordered configurations to the Symmetrization Postulate, we have strong
reasons in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. I therefore conclude that our current overall
evidence strongly favors the view that our fundamental physical space in a quantum
world is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional. I also outline future lines of research
where the evidential balance can be restored or reversed. Finally, I draw some lessons
from this case study to the debate about theoretical equivalence.
Chapter 2 was published in The Journal of Philosophy in 2017.
Chapter 3. Quantum Mechanics in a Time-Asymmetric Universe
Chapter 3 departs from the framework of wave function realism. However, it is still
about the nature and the reality of the quantum state.
In a quantum universe with a strong arrow of time, we postulate a low-entropy
boundary condition (the Past Hypothesis) to account for the temporal asymmetry. In
this chapter, I show that the Past Hypothesis also contains enough information to
simplify the quantum ontology and define a natural initial condition.
First, I introduce Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the quantum state of
the universe is objective and impure. This stands in sharp contrast to Wave Function
Realism, the thesis that the quantum state of the universe is objective and pure. Second,
I suggest that the Past Hypothesis is sufficient to determine a natural density matrix,
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which is simple and unique. This is achieved by what I call the Initial Projection
Hypothesis: the initial density matrix of the universe is the (normalized) projection
onto the Past Hypothesis subspace (in the Hilbert space). Third, because the initial
quantum state is unique and simple, we have a strong case for the Nomological Thesis:
the initial quantum state of the universe is on a par with laws of nature.
This new package of ideas has several interesting implications, including on the
harmony between statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, theoretical unity of the
universe and the subsystems, and the alleged conflict between Humean supervenience
and quantum entanglement.
Chapter 3 is forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
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Chapter 1
The Intrinsic Structure of Quantum Mechanics
1.1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics is empirically successful (at least in the non-relativistic domain).
But what it means remains highly controversial. Since its initial formulation, there have
been many debates (in physics and in philosophy) about the ontology of a quantum-
mechanical world. Chief among them is a serious foundational question about how to
understand the quantum-mechanical laws and the origin of quantum randomness. That
is the topic of the quantum measurement problem. At the time of writing this paper,
the following are serious contenders for being the best solution: Bohmian mechanics
(BM), spontaneous localization theories (GRW0, GRWf, GRWm, CSL), and Everettian
quantum mechanics (EQM and Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI)).1
There are other deep questions about quantum mechanics that have a philosophi-
cal and metaphysical flavor. Opening a standard textbook on quantum mechanics, we
find an abundance of mathematical objects: Hilbert spaces, operators, matrices, wave
functions, and etc. But what do they represent in the physical world? Are they onto-
logically serious to the same degree or are some merely dispensable instruments that
facilitate calculations? In recent debates in metaphysics of quantum mechanics, there
is considerable agreement that the universal wave function, modulo some mathematical
degrees of freedom, represents something objective — the quantum state of the uni-
verse.2 In contrast, matrices and operators are merely convenient summaries that do
1See Norsen (2017) for an updated introduction to the measurement problem and the main solutions.
2The universal quantum state, represented by a universal wave function, can give rise to wave
functions of the subsystems. The clearest examples are the conditional wave functions in Bohmian
mechanics. However, our primary focus here will be on the wave function of the universe.
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not play the same fundamental role as the wave function.
However, the meaning of the universal quantum state is far from clear. We know its
mathematical representation very well: the universal wave function, which is crucially
involved in the dynamics of BM, GRW, and EQM. In the position representation, a
scalar-valued wave function is a square-integrable function from the configuration space
R3N to the complex plane C. But what does the wave function really mean? There are
two ways of pursuing this question:
1. What kind of “thing” does the wave function represent? Does it represent a
physical field on the configuration space, something nomological, or a sui generis
entity in its own ontological category?
2. What is the physical basis for the mathematics used for the wave function? Which
mathematical degrees of freedom of the wave function are physically genuine?
What is the metaphysical explanation for the merely mathematical or gauge de-
grees of freedom?
Much of the philosophical literature on the metaphysics of the wave function has
pursued the first line of questions.3 In this paper, I will primarily pursue the second
one, but I will also show that these two are intimately related.
In particular, I will introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state. It answers
the second line of questions by picking out four concrete relations on physical space-
time. Thus, it makes explicit the physical basis for the usefulness of the mathematics of
the wave function, and it provides a metaphysical explanation for why certain degrees
of freedom in the wave function (the scale of the amplitude and the overall phase) are
merely gauge. The intrinsic account also has the feature that the fundamental ontology
does not include abstract mathematical objects such as complex numbers, functions,
vectors, or sets.
The intrinsic account is therefore nominalistic in the sense of Hartry Field (1980). In
his influential monograph Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism, Field
3See, for example, Albert (1996); Loewer (1996); Wallace and Timpson (2010); North (2013); Ney
(2012); Maudlin (2013); Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2013); Miller (2013); Bhogal and Perry (2015).
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advances a new approach to philosophy of mathematics by explicitly constructing nom-
inalistic counterparts of the platonistic physical theories. In particular, he nominalizes
Newtonian gravitation theory.4 In the same spirit, Frank Arntzenius and Cian Dorr
(2011) develop a nominalization of differential manifolds, laying down the foundation
of a nominalistic theory of classical field theories and general relativity. Up until now,
however, there has been no successful nominalization of quantum theory. In fact, it
has been an open problem–both conceptually and mathematically–how it is to be done.
The non-existence of a nominalistic quantum mechanics has encouraged much skepti-
cism about Field’s program of nominalizing fundamental physics and much optimism
about the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Objects. In-
deed, there is a long-standing conjecture, due to David Malament (1982), that Field’s
nominalism would not succeed in quantum mechanics. Therefore, being nominalistic,
my intrinsic theory of the quantum state would advance Field’s nominalistic project
and provide (the first step of) an answer to Malament’s skepticism.
Another interesting consequence of the account is that it will make progress on the
first line of questions about the ontology of quantum mechanics. On an increasingly
influential interpretation of the wave function, it represents something physically signif-
icant. One version of this view is the so-called “wave function realism,” the view that
the universal wave function represents a physical field on a high-dimensional (funda-
mental) space. That is the position developed and defended in Albert (1996), Loewer
(1996), Ney (2012), and North (2013). However, Tim Maudlin (2013) has argued that
this view leads to an unpleasant proliferation of possibilities: if the wave function rep-
resents a physical field (like the classical electromagnetic field), then a change of the
wave function by an overall phase transformation will produce a distinct physical pos-
sibility. But the two wave functions will be empirically equivalent—no experiments
can distinguish them, which is the reason why the overall phase differences are usually
regarded as merely gauge. Since the intrinsic account of the wave function I offer here
is gauge-free insofar as overall phase is concerned, it removes a major obstacle to wave
function realism (vis-à-vis Maudlin’s objection).
4It is not quite complete as it leaves out integration.
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In this paper, I will first explain (in §2) the two visions for a fundamental physical
theory of the world: the intrinsicalist vision and the nominalistic vision. I will then
discuss why quantum theory may seem to resist the intrinsic and nominalistic refor-
mulation. Next (in §3), I will write down an intrinsic and nominalistic theory of the
quantum state. Finally (in §4), I will discuss how this account bears on the nature of
phase and the debate about wave function realism.
Along the way, I axiomatize the quantum phase structure as what I shall call a peri-
odic difference structure and prove a representation theorem and a uniqueness theorem.
These formal results could prove fruitful for further investigation into the metaphysics
of quantum mechanics and theoretical structure in physical theories.
1.2 The Two Visions and the Quantum Obstacle
There are, broadly speaking, two grand visions for what a fundamental physical theory
of the world should look like. (To be sure, there are many other visions and aspira-
tions.) The first is what I shall call the intrinsicalist vision, the requirement that the
fundamental theory be written in a form without any reference to arbitrary conven-
tions such as coordinate systems and units of scale. The second is the nominalistic
vision, the requirement that the fundamental theory be written without any reference
to mathematical objects. The first one is familiar to mathematical physicists from the
development of synthetic geometry and differential geometry. The second one is familiar
to philosophers of mathematics and philosophers of physics working on the ontological
commitment of physical theories. First, I will describe the two visions, explain their
motivations, and provide some examples. Next, I will explain why quantum mechanics
seems to be an obstacle for both programs.
1.2.1 The Intrinsicalist Vision
The intrinsicalist vision is best illustrated with some history of Euclidean geometry.
Euclid showed that complex geometrical facts can be demonstrated using rigorous proof
on the basis of simple axioms. However, Euclid’s axioms do not mention real numbers
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or coordinate systems, for they were not yet discovered. They are stated with only
qualitative predicates such as the equality of line segments and the congruence of angles.
With these concepts, Euclid was able to derive a large body of geometrical propositions.
Real numbers and coordinate systems were introduced to facilitate the derivations.
With the full power of real analysis, the metric function defined on pairs of tuples of
coordinate numbers can greatly speed up the calculations, which usually take up many
steps of logical derivation on Euclid’s approach. But what are the significance of the
real numbers and coordinate systems? When representing a 3-dimensional Euclidean
space, a typical choice is to use R3. It is clear that such a representation has much
surplus (or excess) structure: the origin of the coordinate system, the orientation of
the axis, and the scale are all arbitrarily chosen (sometimes conveniently chosen for
ease of calculation). There is “more information” or “more structure” in R3 than in
the 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In other words, the R3 representation has gauge
degrees of freedom.
The real, intrinsic structure in the 3-dimensional Euclidean space–the structure that
is represented by R3 up to the Euclidean transformations–can be understood as an ax-
iomatic structure of congruence and betweenness. In fact, Hilbert 1899 and Tarski 1959
give us ways to make this statement more precise. After offering a rigorous axioma-
tization of Euclidean geometry, they prove a representation theorem: any structure
instantiates the betweenness and congruence axioms of 3-dimensional Euclidean geom-
etry if and only if there is a 1-1 embedding function from the structure onto R3 such
that if we define a metric function in the usual Pythagorean way then the metric func-
tion is homomorphic: it preserves the exact structure of betweenness and congruence.
Moreover, they prove a uniqueness theorem: any other embedding function defined on
the same domain satisfies the same conditions of homomorphism if and only if it is a
Euclidean transformation of the original embedding function: a transformation on R3
that can be obtained by some combination of shift of origin, reflection, rotation, and
positive scaling.
The formal results support the idea that we can think of the genuine, intrinsic
features of 3-dimensional Euclidean space as consisting directly of betweenness and
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congruence relations on spatial points, and we can regard the coordinate system (R3)
and the metric function as extrinsic representational features we bring to facilitate cal-
culations. (Exercise: prove the Pythagorean Theorem with and without real-numbered
coordinate systems.) The merely representational artifacts are highly useful but still
dispensable.
There are several advantages of having an intrinsic formulation of geometry. First,
it eliminates the need for many arbitrary conventions: where to place the origin, how
to orient the axis, and what scale to use. Second, in the absence of these arbitrary con-
ventions, we have a theory whose elements could stand in one-to-one correspondence
with elements of reality. In that case, we can look directly into the real structure of the
geometrical objects without worrying that we are looking at some merely representa-
tional artifact (or gauge degrees of freedom). By eliminating redundant structure in a
theory, an intrinsic formulation gives us a more perspicuous picture of the geometrical
reality.
The lessons we learn from the history of Euclidean geometry can be extended to
other parts of physics. For example, people have long noticed that there are many
gauge degrees of freedom in the representation of both scalar and vector valued physical
quantities: temperature, mass, potential, and field values. There has been much debate
in philosophy of physics about what structure is physically genuine and and what is
merely gauge. It would therefore be helpful to go beyond the scope of physical geometry
and extend the intrinsic approach to physical theories in general.
Hartry Field (1980), building on previous work by Krantz et al. (1971), ingeniously
extends the intrinsic approach to Newtonian gravitation theory. The result is an elim-
ination of arbitrary choices of zero field value and units of mass. His conjecture is that
all physical theories can be “intrinsicalized” in one way or another.
1.2.2 The Nominalist Vision
As mentioned earlier, Field (1980) provides an intrinsic version of Newtonian gravitation
theory. But the main motivation and the major achievement of his project is a defense
of nominalism, the thesis that there are no abstract entities, and, in particular, no
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abstract mathematical entities such as numbers, functions, and sets.
The background for Field’s nominalistic project is the classic debate between the
mathematical nominalist and the mathematical platonist, the latter of whom is onto-
logically committed to the existence of abstract mathematical objects. Field identifies
a main problem of maintaining nominalism is the apparent indispensability of mathe-
matical objects in formulating our best physical theories:
Since I deny that numbers, functions, sets, etc. exist, I deny that it is
legitimate to use terms that purport to refer to such entities, or variables
that purport to range over such entities, in our ultimate account of what
the world is really like.
This appears to raise a problem: for our ultimate account of what the
world is really like must surely include a physical theory; and in developing
physical theories one needs to use mathematics; and mathematics is full of
such references to and quantifications over numbers, functions, sets, and
the like. It would appear then that nominalism is not a position that can
reasonably be maintained.5
In other words, the main task of defending nominalism would be to respond to the
Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument:6
P1 We ought to be ontologically committed to all (and only) those entities that are
indispensable to our best theories of the world. [Quine’s Criterion of Ontological
Commitment]
P2 Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best theories of the world. [The
Indispensability Thesis]
C Therefore, we ought to be ontologically committed to mathematical entities.
5Field (2016), Preliminary Remarks, p.1.
6The argument was originally proposed by W. V. Quine and later developed by Putnam (1971).
This version is from Colyvan (2015).
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In particular, Field’s task is to refute the second premise–the Indispensability Thesis.
Field proposes to replace all platonistic physical theories with attractive nominalistic
versions that do not quantify over mathematical objects
Field’s nominalistic versions of physical theories would have significant advantages
over their platonistic counterparts. First, the nominalistic versions illuminate what ex-
actly in the physical world provide the explanations for the usefulness of any particular
mathematical representation. After all, even a platonist might accept that numbers
and coordinate systems do not really exist in the physical world but merely represent
some concrete physical reality. Such an attitude is consistent with the platonist’s en-
dorsement of the Indispensability Thesis. Second, as Field has argued, the nominalistic
physics seems to provide better explanations than the platonistic counterparts, for the
latter would involve explanation of physical phenomena by things (such as numbers)
external to the physical processes themselves.
Field has partially succeeded by writing down an intrinsic theory of physical geome-
try and Newtonian gravitation, as it contains no explicit first-order quantification over
mathematical objects, thus qualifying his theory as nominalistic. But what about other
theories? Despite the initial success of his project, there has been significant skepticism
about whether his project can extend beyond Newtonian gravitation theory to more
advanced theories such as quantum mechanics.
1.2.3 Obstacles From Quantum Theory
We have looked at the motivations for the two visions for what the fundamental theory
of the world should look like: the intrinsicalist vision and the nominalistic vision. They
should not be thought of as competing against each other. They often converge on
a common project. Indeed, Field’s reformulation of Newtonian Gravitation Theory is
both intrinsic and nominalistic.7
Both have had considerable success in certain segments of classical theories. But
7However, the intrinsicalist and nominalistic visions can also come apart. For example, we can, in the
case of mass, adopt an intrinsic yet platonistic theory of mass ratios. We can also adopt an extrinsic yet
nominalistic theory of mass relations by using some arbitrary object (say, my water bottle) as standing
for unit mass and assigning comparative relations between that arbitrary object and every other object.
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with the rich mathematical structures and abstract formalisms in quantum mechanics,
both seem to run into obstacles. David Malament was one of the earliest critics of the
nominalistic vision. He voiced his skepticism in his influential review of Field’s book.
Malament states his general worry as follows:
Suppose Field wants to give some physical theory a nominalistic refor-
mulation. Further suppose the theory determines a class of mathematical
models, each of which consists of a set of “points” together with certain
mathematical structures defined on them. Field’s nominalization strategy
cannot be successful unless the objects represented by the points are ap-
propriately physical (or non-abstract)...But in lots of cases the represented
objects are abstract. (Malament (1982), pp. 533, emphasis original.)8
Given his general worry that, often in physical theories, it is abstracta that are repre-
sented in the state spaces, Malament conjectures that, in the specific case of quantum
mechanics, Field’s strategy of nominalization would not “have a chance”:
Here [in the context of quantum mechanics] I do not really see how Field
can get started at all. I suppose one can think of the theory as determining
a set of models—each a Hilbert space. But what form would the recov-
ery (i.e., representation) theorem take? The only possibility that comes to
mind is a theorem of the sort sought by Jauch, Piron, et al. They start with
“propositions” (or “eventualities”) and lattice-theoretic relations as primi-
tive, and then seek to prove that the lattice of propositions is necessarily
isomorphic to the lattice of subspaces of some Hilbert space. But of course
no theorem of this sort would be of any use to Field. What could be worse
than propositions (or eventualities)? (Malament (1982), pp. 533-34.)
As I understand it, Malament suggests that there are no good places to start nominal-
izing non-relativistic quantum mechanics. This is because the obvious starting point,
8Malament also gives the example of classical Hamiltonian mechanics as another specific instance
of the general worry. But this is not the place to get into classical mechanics. Suffice to say that there
are several ways to nominalize classical mechanics. Field’s nominalistic Newtonian Gravitation Theory
is one way. Arntzenius and Dorr (2011) provides another way.
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according to Malament and other commentators, is the abstract Hilbert space, H , as
it is a state space of the quantum state.
However, there may be other starting points to nominalize quantum mechanics.
For example, the configuration space, R3N , is a good candidate. In realist quantum
theories such as Bohmian mechanics, Everettian quantum mechanics, and spontaneous
localization theories, it is standard to postulate a (normalized) universal wave function
Ψ(x, t) defined on the configuration space(-time) and a dynamical equation governing
its temporal evolution.9 In the deterministic case, the wave function evolves according










∆i + V (x)]Ψ(x, t) ∶=HΨ(x, t),
which relates the temporal derivatives of the wave function to its spatial derivatives.
Now, the configuration-space viewpoint can be translated into the Hilbert space formal-
ism. If we regard the wave function (a square-integrable function from the configuration
space to complex numbers) as a unit vector 󳈌Ψ(t)⟩, then we can form another space—
the Hilbert space of the system.10 Thus, the wave function can be mapped to a state
vector, and vice versa. The state vector then rotates (on the unit sphere in the Hilbert




󳈌Ψ(t)⟩ = Ĥ 󳈌Ψ(t)⟩ ,
which is another way to express the Schrödinger evolution of the wave function.
Hence, there is the possibility of carrying out the nominalization project with
the configuration space. In some respects, the configuration-space viewpoint is more
friendly to nominalism, as the configuration space is much closely related to physical
space than the abstract Hilbert space is.11 Nevertheless, Malament’s worries still re-
main, because (prima facie) the configuration space is also quite abstract, and it is
9Bohmian mechanics postulates additional ontologies—particles with precise locations in physical
space—and an extra law of motion—the guidance equation. GRW theories postulate an additional
stochastic modification of the Schrödinger equation and, for some versions, additional ontologies such
as flashes and mass densities in physical space.
10This is the Hilbert space L2(R3N ,C), equipped with the inner product < ψ,φ > of taking the
Lebesgue integral of ψ∗φ over the configuration space, which guarantees Cauchy Completeness.
11I should emphasize that, because of its central role in functional analysis, Hilbert space is highly
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unclear how to fit it into the nominalistic framework. Therefore, at least prima facie,
quantum mechanics seems to frustrate the nominalistic vision.
Moreover, the mathematics of quantum mechanics comes with much conventional
structure that is hard to get rid of. For example, we know that the exact value of the
amplitude of the wave function is not important. For that matter, we can scale it with
any arbitrary positive constant. It is true that we usually choose the scale such that
we get unity when integrating the amplitude over the entire configuration space. But
that is merely conventional. We can, for example, write down the Born rule with a
proportionality constant to get unity in the probability function:
P (x ∈X) = Z 󱮬
X
󳈌Ψ(x)󳈌2dx,
where Z is a normalization constant.
Another example is the overall phase of the wave function. As we learn from modular
arithmetic, the exact value of the phase of the wave function is not physically significant,
as we can add a constant phase factor to every point in configuration space and the
wave function will remain physically the same: producing exactly the same predictions
in terms of probabilities.
All these gauge degrees of freedom are frustrating from the point of view of the
intrinsicalist vision. They are the manifestation of excess structures in the quantum
theory. What exactly is going on in the real world that allows for these gauge degrees
of freedom but not others? What is the most metaphysically perspicuous picture of the
quantum state, represented by the wave function? Many people would respond that
the quantum state is projective, meaning that the state space for the quantum state is
not the Hilbert space, but its quotient space: the projective Hilbert space. It can be
obtained by quotienting the usual Hilbert space with the equivalence relation ψ ∼ Reiθψ.
But this is not satisfying; the “quotienting” strategy raises a similar question: what
important for fascilitating calculations and proving theorems about quantum mechanics. Nevertheless,
we should not regard it as conclusive evidence for ontological priority. Indeed, as we shall see in §3, the
configuration-space viewpoint provides a natural platform for the nominalization of the universal wave
function. We should also keep in mind that, at the end of the day, it suffices to show that quantum
mechanics can be successfully nominalized from some viewpoint.
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exactly is going on in the real world that allows for quotienting with this equivalence
relation but not others?12 No one, as far as I know, has offered an intrinsic picture of
the quantum state, even in the non-relativistic domain.
In short, at least prima facie, both the intrinsicalist vision and the nominalist vision
are challenged by quantum mechanics.
1.3 An Intrinsic and Nominalistic Account of the Quantum State
In this section, I propose a new account of the quantum state based on some lessons we
learned from the debates about wave function realism.13 As we shall see, it does not
take much to overcome the “quantum obstacle.” For simplicity, I will focus on the case
of a quantum state for a constant number of identical particles without spin.
1.3.1 The Mathematics of the Quantum State
First, let me explain my strategy for nominalizing non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
1. I will start with a Newtonian space-time, whose nominalization is readily avail-
able.14
2. I will use symmetries as a guide to fundamentality and identify the intrinsic
structure of the universal quantum state on the Newtonian space-time. This will
12These questions, I believe, are in the same spirit as Ted Sider’s 2016 Locke Lecture (ms.), and
especially his final lecture on theoretical equivalence and against what he calls“quotienting by hand.”
I should mention that both Sider and I are really after gauge-free formulations of physical and meta-
physical theories, which are more stringent than merely gauge-independent formulations. For exam-
ple, modern differential geometry is gauge-independent (coordinate-independent) but not gauge-free
(coordinate-free): although manifolds can be defined without privileging any particular coordinate
system, their definition still uses coordinate systems (maps and atlas).
13Here I’m taking the “Hard Road” to nominalism. As such, my goal is to (1) reformulate quantum
mechanics (QM) such that within the theory it no longer refers (under first-order quantifiers) to math-
ematical objects such as numbers, functions, or sets and (2) demonstrate that the platonistic version
of QM is conservative over the nominalistic reformulation. To arrive at my theory, and to state and
prove the representation theorems, I refer to some mathematical objects. But these are parts of the
meta-theory to explicate the relation between my account and the platonistic counterpart and to argue
(by reductio) against the indispensability thesis. See Field (2016), Preliminary Remarks and Ch. 1
for a clear discussion, and Colyvan (2010) for an up-to-date assessment of the “Easy Road” option.
Thanks to Andrea Oldofredi and Ted Sider for suggesting that I make this clear.
14It is an interesting question what role Galilean relativity plays in non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics. I will explore this issue in future work.
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be the goal for the remaining part of the paper. (Here we focus only on the
quantum state, because it is novel and it seems to resist nominalization. But
the theory leaves room for additional ontologies of particles, fields, mass densities
supplied by specific interpretations of QM; these additional ontologies are readily
nominalizable.)
3. In future work, I will develop nominalistic translations of the dynamical equations
and generalize this account to accommodate more complicated quantum theories.
Before we get into the intrinsic structure of the universal quantum state, we need to
say a bit more about its mathematical structure. For the quantum state of a spinless
system at a time t, we can represent it with a scalar-valued wave function:
Ψt ∶ R3N → C,
where N is the number of particles in the system, R3N is the configuration space of N
particles, and C is the complex plane. (For the quantum state of a system with spin,
we can use a vector-valued wave function whose range is the spinor space—C2N .)
My strategy is to start with a Newtonian space-time (which is usually represented
by a Cartesian product of a 3-dimensional Euclidean space and a 1-dimensional time).
If we want to nominalize the quantum state, what should we do with the configuration
space R3N? As is now familiar from the debate about wave function realism, there are
two ways of interpreting the fundamental physical space for a quantum world:
1. R3N represents the fundamental physical space; the space represented by R3 only
appears to be real; the quantum state assigns a complex number to each point in
R3N . (Analogy: classical field.)
2. R3 represents the fundamental physical space; the space represented by R3N is a
mathematical construction—the configuration space; the quantum state assigns
a complex number to each region in R3 that contains N points (i.e. the regions
will be irregular and disconnected). (Analogy: multi-field)
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Some authors in the debate about wave function realism have argued that given our
current total evidence, option (2) is a better interpretation of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics.15 I will not rehearse their arguments here. But one of the key ideas that will
help us here is that we can think of the complex-valued function as really “living on”
the 3-dimensional physical space, in the sense that it assigns a complex number not to
each point but each N -element region in physical space. We call that a “multi-field.”16
Taking the wave function into a framework friendly for further nominalization, we
can perform the familiar technique of decomposing the complex number Reiθ into two
real numbers: the amplitude R and the phase θ. That is, we can think of the compex-
valued multi-field in the physical space as two real-valued multi-fields:
R(x1, x2, x3, ..., xN), θ(x1, x2, x3, ..., xN).
Here, since we are discussing Newtonian space-time, the x1.....xN are simultaneous
space-time points. We can think of them as: (xα1 , xβ1 , xγ1 , xt), (xα2 , xβ2 , xγ2 , xt), ......,
(xαN , xβN , xγN , xt).
Now the task before us is just to come up with a nominalistic and intrinsic de-
scription of the two multi-fields. In §3.2 and §3.3, we will find two physical structures
(Quantum State Amplitude and Quantum State Phase), which, via the appropriate
representation theorems and uniqueness theorems, justify the use of complex numbers
and explain the gauge degrees of freedom in the quantum wave function.17
15See, for example, Chen (2017) and Hubert and Romano (2018).
16This name can be a little confusing. Wave-function “multi-field” was first used in Belot (2012),
which was an adaptation of the name “polyfield” introduced by Forrest (1988). See Arntzenius and
Dorr (2011) for a completely different object called the “multi-field.”
17In the case of a vector-valued wave function, since the wave function value consists in 2N complex
numbers, where N is the number of particles, we would need to nominalize 2N+1 real-valued functions:
R1(x1, x2, x3, ..., xN), θ1(x1, x2, x3, ..., xN),R2(x1, x2, x3, ..., xN), θ2(x1, x2, x3, ..., xN), ......
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1.3.2 Quantum State Amplitude
The amplitude part of the quantum state is (like mass density) on the ratio scale, i.e.
the physical structure should be invariant under ratio transformations
R → αR.
We will start with the Newtonian space-time and help ourselves to the structure of
N-Regions: collection of all regions that contain exactly N simultaneous space-time
points (which are irregular and disconnected regions). We start here because we would
like to have a physical realization of the platonistic configuration space. The solution is
to identify configuration points with certain special regions of the physical space-time.18
In addition to N-Regions, the quantum state amplitude structure will contain two
primitive relations:
• A two-place relation Amplitude–Geq (⪰A).
• A three-place relation Amplitude–Sum (S).
Interpretation: a ⪰A b iff the amplitude of N-Region a is greater than or equal to
that of N-Region b; S(a, b, c) iff the amplitude of N-Region c is the sum of those of
N-Regions a and b.
Define the following short-hand (all quantifiers below range over only N-Regions):
1. a =A b ∶= a ⪰A b and b ⪰A a.
2. a ≻A b ∶= a ⪰A b and not b ⪰A a.
18Notes on mereology: As I am taking for granted that quantum mechanics for indistinguishable par-
ticles (sometimes called identical particles) works just as well as quantum mechanics for distinguishable
particles, I do not require anything more than Atomistic General Extensional Mereology (AGEM). That
is, the mereological system that validate the following principles: Partial Ordering of Parthood, Strong
Supplementation, Unrestricted Fusion, and Atomicity. See Varzi (2016) for a detailed discussion.
However, I leave open the possibility for adding structures in N-Regions to distinguish among
different ways of forming regions from the same collection of points, corresponding to permuted config-
urations of distinguishable particles. We might need to introduce additional structure for mereological
composition to distinguish between mereological sums formed from the same atoms but in different
orders. This might also be required when we have entangled quantum states of different species of
particles. To achieve this, we can borrow some ideas from Kit Fine’s “rigid embodiment” and add
primitive ordering relations to enrich the structure of mereological sums.
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Next, we can write down some axioms for Amplitude–Geq and Amplitude–Sum.19
Again, all quantifiers below range over only N-Regions. ∀a, b, c ∶
G1 (Connectedness) Either a ⪰A b or b ⪰A a.
G2 (Transitivity) If a ⪰A b and b ⪰A c, then a ⪰A c.
S1 (Associativity*) If ∃x S(a, b, x) and ∀x󰐞 [if S(a, b, x󰐞)) then ∃y S(x󰐞, c, y)], then ∃z
S(b, c, z) and ∀z󰐞 [if S(b, c, z󰐞)) then ∃w S(a, z󰐞, w)] and ∀f, f 󰐞, g, g󰐞 [if S(a, b, f)∧
S(f, c, f 󰐞) ∧ S(b, c, g) ∧ S(a, g, g󰐞), then f 󰐞 ⪰A g󰐞].
S2 (Monotonicity*) If ∃x S(a, c, x) and a ⪰A b, then ∃y S(c, b, y) and ∀f, f 󰐞 [if
S(a, c, f) ∧ S(c, b, f 󰐞) then f ⪰A f 󰐞].
S3 (Density) If a ≻A b, then ∃d, x [S(b, d, x) and ∀f, if S(b, x, f), then a ⪰A f].
S4 (Non-Negativity) If S(a, b, c), then c ⪰A a.
S5 (Archimedean Property) ∀a1, b, if ¬S(a1, a1, a1) and ¬S(b, b, b), then ∃a1, a2, ..., an
s.t. b ≻A an and ∀ai [if b ≻A ai, then an ⪰A ai], where ai’s, if they exist, have the fol-
lowing properties: S(a1, a1, a2), S(a1, a2, a3), S(a1, a3, a4), ..., S(a1, an−1, an).20
19Compare with the axioms in Krantz et al. (1971) Defn.3.3: Let A be a nonempty set, ⪰ a binary
relation on A, B a nonempty subset of A ×A, and ○ a binary function from B into A. The quadruple
< A,⪰,B, ○ > is an extensive structure with no essential maximum if the following axioms are satisfied
for all a, b, c ∈ A:
1. < A,⪰> is a weak order. [This is translated as G1 and G2.]
2. If (a, b) ∈ B and (a ○ b, c) ∈ B, then (b, c) ∈ B, (a, b ○ c) ∈ B, and (a ○ b) ○ c ⪰A a ○ (b ○ c). [This is
translated as S1.]
3. If (a, c) ∈ B and a ⪰ b, then (c, b) ∈ B, and a ○ c ⪰ c ○ b. [This is translated as S2.]
4. If a ≻ b, then ∃d ∈ A s.t. (b, d) ∈ B and a ⪰ b ○ d. [This is translated as S3.]
5. If a ○ b = c, then c ≻ a. [This is translated as S4, but allowing N-Regions to have null amplitudes.
The representation function will also be zero-valued at those regions.]
6. Every strictly bounded standard sequence is finite, where a1, ..., an, ... is a standard sequence
if for n = 2, .., an = an−1 ○ a1, and it is strictly bounded if for some b ∈ A and for all an in
the sequence, b ≻ an. [This is translated as S5. The translation uses the fact that Axiom 6 is
equivalent to another formulation of the Archimedean axiom: {n󳈌na is defined and b ≻ na} is
finite.]
The complications in the nominalistic axioms come from the fact that there can be more than one
N-Regions that are the Amplitude-Sum of two N-Regions: ∃a, b, c, d s.t. S(a, b, c) ∧ S(a, b, d) ∧ c ≠ d.
However, in the proof for the representation and uniqueness theorems, we can easily overcome these
complications by taking equivalence classes of equal amplitude and recover the amplitude addition
function from the Amplitude-Sum relation.
20S5 is an infinitary sentence, as the quantifiers in the consequent should be understood as infinite
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Since these axioms are the nominalistic translations of a platonistic structure in Krantz
et al. (Defn. 3.3), we can formulate the representation and uniqueness theorems for
the amplitude structure as follows:
Theorem 1.3.1 (Amplitude Representation Theorem) ¡N-Regions, Amplitude–
Geq, Amplitude–Sum¿ satisfies axioms (G1)—(G2) and (S1)—(S5), only if there is a
function R ∶ N-Regions→ {0} ∪R+ such that ∀a, b ∈ N-Regions:
1. a ⪰A b⇔ R(a) ≥ R(b);
2. If ∃x s.t. S(a, b, x), then ∀c [if S(a, b, c) then R(c) = R(a) +R(b)].
Theorem 1.3.2 (Amplitude Uniqueness Theorem) If another function R󰐞 satis-
fies the conditions on the RHS of the Amplitude Representation Theorem, then there
exists a real number α > 0 such that for all nonmaximal element a ∈ N-Regions,
R󰐞(a) = αR(a).
Proofs: See Krantz et al. (1971), Sections 3.4.3, 3.5, pp. 84-87. Note: Krantz et
al. use an addition function ○, while we use a sum relation S(x, y, z), because we allow
there to be distinct N-Regions that have the same amplitude. Nevertheless, we can use
a standard technique to adapt their proof: we can simply take the equivalence classes
disjunctions of quantified sentences. However, S5 can also be formulated with a stronger axiom called
Dedekind Completeness, whose platonistic version says:
Dedekind Completeness. ∀M,N ⊂ A, if ∀x ∈ M,∀y ∈ N,y ≻ x, then ∃z ∈ A s.t. ∀x ∈ M,z ≻
x and ∀y ∈ N,y ≻ z.
The nominalistic translation can be done in two ways. We can introduce two levels of mereology so
as to distinguish between regions of points and regions of regions of points. Alternatively, as Tom
Donaldson, Jennifer Wang, and Gabriel Uzquiano suggest to me, perhaps one can make do with plural
quantification in the following way. For example ( with ∝ for the logical predicate “is one of” ), here
is one way to state the Dedekind Completeness with plural quantification:
Dedekind Completeness Nom Pl. ∀mm,nn ∈ N-Regions, if ∀x∝mm,∀y ∝ nn, y ≻ x, then there
exists z ∈ A s.t. ∀x∝mm,z ≻ x and ∀y ∝ nn, y ≻ z.
We only need the Archimedean property in the proof. Since Dedekind Completeness is stronger, the
proof in Krantz et al. (1971), pp. 84-87 can still go through if we assume Dedekind Completeness Nom
Pl. Such strenghthening of S5 has the virtue of avoiding the infinitary sentences in S5. Note: this is the
point where we have to trade off certain nice features of first-order logic and standard mereology with
the desiderata of the intrinsic and nominalistic account. (I have no problem with infinitary sentences
in S5. But one is free to choose instead to use plural quantification to formulate the last axiom as
Dedekind Completeness Nom Pl.) This is related to Field’s worry in Science Without Numbers, Ch. 9,
“Logic and Ontology.”
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N-Regions / =A, where a =A b if a ⪰A b ∧ b ⪰A a, on which we can define an addition
function with the Amplitude-Sum relation.
The representation theorem suggests that the intrinsic structure of Amplitude-Geq
and Amplitude-Sum guarantees the existence of a faithful representation function. But
the intrinsic structure makes no essential quantification over numbers, functions, sets,
or matrices. The uniqueness theorem explains why the gauge degrees of freedom are the
positive multiplication transformations and no further, i.e. why the amplitude function
is unique up to a positive normalization constant.
1.3.3 Quantum State Phase
The phase part of the quantum state is (like angles on a plane) of the periodic scale, i.e.
the intrinsic physical structure should be invariant under overall phase transformations
θ → θ + φ mod 2π.
We would like something of the form of a “difference structure.” But we know that
according to standard formalism, just the absolute values of the differences would not be
enough, for time reversal on the quantum state is implemented by taking the complex
conjugation of the wave function, which is an operation that leaves the absolute values
of the differences unchanged. So we will try to construct a signed difference structure
such that standard operations on the wave function are faithfully preserved.21
We will once again start with N-Regions, the collection of all regions that contain
exactly N simultaneous space-time points.
The intrinsic structure of phase consists in two primitive relations:
• A three-place relation Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness (CP ),
• A four-place relation Phase–Congruence (∼P ).
21Thanks to Sheldon Goldstein for helpful discussions about this point. David Wallace points out
(p.c.) that it might be a virtue of the nominalistic theory to display the following choice-point: one
can imagine an axiomatization of quantum state phase that involves only absolute phase differences.
This would require thinking more deeply about the relationship between quantum phases and temporal
structure, as well as a new mathematical axiomatization of the absolute difference structure for phase.
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Interpretation: CP (a, b, c) iff the phase of N-Region b is clock-wise between those of
N-Regions a and c (this relation realizes the intuitive idea that 3 o’clock is clock-wise
between 1 o’clock and 6 o’clock, but 3 o’clock is not clock-wise between 6 o’clock and 1
o’clock); ab ∼P cd iff the signed phase difference between N-Regions a and b is the same
as that between N-Regions c and d.
The intrinsic structures of Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness and Phase–Congruence
satisfy the following axioms for what I shall call a “periodic difference structure”:
All quantifiers below range over only N-Regions. ∀a, b, c, d, e, f :
C1 At least one of CP (a, b, c) and CP (a, c, b) holds; if a, b, c are pair-wise distinct,
then exactly one of CP (a, b, c) and CP (a, c, b) holds.
C2 If CP (a, b, c) and CP (a, c, d), then CP (a, b, d); if CP (a, b, c), then CP (b, c, a).
K1 ab ∼P ab.
K2 ab ∼P cd⇔ cd ∼P ab⇔ ba ∼P dc⇔ ac ∼P bd.
K3 If ab ∼P cd and cd ∼P ef , then ab ∼P ef .
K4 ∃h, cb ∼P ah; if CP (a, b, c), then
∃d󰐞, d󰐞󰐞 s.t. ba ∼P d󰐞c, ca ∼P d󰐞󰐞b; ∃p, q,CP (a, q, b), CP (a, b, p), ap ∼P pb, bq ∼P qa.
K5 ab ∼P cd⇔ [∀e, fd ∼P ae⇔ fc ∼P be].
K6 ∀e, f, g, h, if fc ∼P be and gb ∼P ae, then [hf ∼P ae⇔ hc ∼P ge].
K7 If CP (a, b, c), then ∀e, d, a󰐞, b󰐞, c󰐞 [if a󰐞d ∼P ae, b󰐞d ∼P be, c󰐞d ∼P ce, then C(a󰐞, b󰐞, c󰐞)].
K8 (Archimedean Property) ∀a, a1, b1, if CP (a, a1, b1), then
∃a1, a2, ..., an, b1, b2, ..., bn, c1, ...cm such that CP (a, a1, an) and CP (a, bn, b1), where
anan−1 ∼P an−1an−2 ∼P ... ∼P a1a2 and bnbn−1 ∼P bn−1bn−2 ∼P ... ∼P b1b2, and that
a1b1 ∼P b1c1 ∼P ... ∼P cna1.22
22Here it might again be desirable to avoid the infinitary sentences / axiom schema by using plural
quantification. See the footnote on Axiom S5.
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Axiom (K4) contains several existence assumptions. But such assumptions are jus-
tified for a nominalistic quantum theory. We can see this from the structure of the
platonistic quantum theory. Thanks to the Schrödinger dynamics, the wave function
will spread out continuously over space and time, which will ensure the richness in the
phase structure.
With some work, we can prove the following representation and uniqueness theo-
rems:
Theorem 1.3.3 (Phase Representation Theorem) If
< N-Regions, Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness, Phase–Congruence> is a periodic dif-
ference structure, i.e. satisfies axioms (C1)—(C2) and (K1)—(K8), then for any real
number k > 0, there is a function f ∶ N-Regions → [0, k) such that ∀a, b, c, d ∈ N-
Regions:
1. CP (c, b, a)⇔ f(a) ≥ f(b) ≥ f(c) or f(c) ≥ f(a) ≥ f(b) or f(b) ≥ f(c) ≥ f(a);
2. ab ∼P cd⇔ f(a) − f(b) = f(c) − f(d) (mod k).
Theorem 1.3.4 (Phase Uniqueness Theorem) If another function f 󰐞 satisfies the
conditions on the RHS of the Phase Representation Theorem, then there exists a real
number β such that for all element a ∈ N-Regions , f 󰐞(a) = f(a) + β (mod k).
Proofs: see Appendix A.
Again, the representation theorem suggests that the intrinsic structure of Phase–
Clockwise–Betweenness and Phase–Congruence guarantees the existence of a faithful
representation function of phase. But the intrinsic structure makes no essential quan-
tification over numbers, functions, sets, or matrices. The uniqueness theorem explains
why the gauge degrees of freedom are the overall phase transformations and no further,
i.e. why the phase function is unique up to an additive constant.
Therefore, we have written down an intrinsic and nominalistic theory of the quan-
tum state, consisting in merely four relations on the regions of physical space-time:
Amplitude-Sum, Amplitude-Geq, Phase-Congruence, and Phase-Clockwise-Betweenness.
As mentioned earlier but evident now, the present account of the quantum state has
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several desirable features: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects
such as complex numbers, (2) it is free from the usual arbitrary conventions in the wave
function representation, and (3) it explains why the quantum state has its amplitude
and phase degrees of freedom.
1.3.4 Comparisons with Balaguer’s Account
Let us briefly compare my account with Mark Balaguer’s account (1996) of the nomi-
nalization of quantum mechanics.
Balaguer’s account follows Malament’s suggestion of nominalizing quantum mechan-
ics by taking seriously the Hilbert space structure and the representation of “quantum
events” with closed subspaces of Hilbert spaces. Following orthodox textbook presen-
tation of quantum mechanics, he suggests that we take as primitives the propensities
of quantum systems as analogous to probabilities of quantum experimental outcomes.
I begin by recalling that each quantum state can be thought of as a function
from events (A,∆) to probabilities, i.e., to [0,1]. Thus, each quantum state
specifies a set of ordered pairs < (A,∆), r >. The next thing to notice is
that each such ordered pair determines a propensity property of quantum
systems, namely, an r−strengthed propensity to yield a value in∆ for a mea-
surement of A. We can denote this propensity with “(A,∆, r)”. (Balaguer,
1996, p.218.)
Balaguer suggests that the propensities are “nominalistically kosher.” By interpreting
the Hilbert space structures as propensities instead of propositions, Balaguer makes
some progress in the direction of making quantum mechanics “more nominalistic.”
However, Balaguer’s account faces a problem—it is not clear how Balaguer’s account
relates to any mainstream realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is because
the realist interpretations—Bohmian Mechanics, GRW spontaneous collapse theories,
and Everettian Quantum Mechanics—crucially involve the quantum state represented
by a wave function, not a function from events to probabilities.23 And once we add
23See Bueno (2003) for a discussion about the conflicts between Balaguer’s account and the modal
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the wave function (perhaps in the nominalistic form introduced in this paper), the
probabilities can be calculated (via the Born rule) from the wave function itself, which
makes primitive propensities redundant. If Balaguer’s account is based on orthodox
quantum mechanics, then it would suffer from the dependence on vague notions such as
“measurement,” “observation,” and “observables,” which should have no place in the
fundamental ontology or dynamics of a physical theory.24
1.4 “Wave Function Realism”
The intrinsic and nominalistic account of the quantum state provides a natural response
to some of the standard objections to “wave function realism.”25 According to David
Albert (1996), realism about the wave function naturally commits one to accept that
the wave function is a physical field defined on a fundamentally 3N-dimensional wave
function space. Tim Maudlin (2013) criticizes Albert’s view partly on the ground that
such “naive” realism would commit one to take as fundamental the gauge degrees of
freedom such as the absolute values of the amplitude and the phase, leaving empirically
equivalent formulations as metaphysically distinct. This “naive” realism is inconsistent
with the physicists’ attitude of understanding the Hilbert space projectively and think-
ing of the quantum state as an equivalence class of wave functions (ψ ∼ Reiθψ). If a
defender of wave function realism were to take the physicists’ attitude, says the oppo-
nent, it would be much less natural to think of the wave function as really a physical
field, as something that assigns physical properties to each point in the 3N-dimensional
space. Defenders of wave function realism have largely responded by biting the bullet
and accepting the costs.
But the situation changes given the present account of the quantum state. Given
the intrinsic theory of the quantum state, one can be realist about the quantum state by
interpretation of QM.
24Bell (1989), “Against ‘Measurement,’ ” pp. 215-16.
25“Wave function realists,” such as David Albert, Barry Loewer, Alyssa Ney, and Jill North, maintain
that the fundamental physical space for a quantum world is 3N-dimensional. In contrast, primitive
ontologists, such as Valia Allori, Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein, Tim Maudlin, Roderich Tumulka, and
Nino Zanghi, argue that the fundamental physical space is 3-dimensional.
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being realist about the four intrinsic relations underlying the mathematical and gauge-
dependent description of the wave function. The intrinsic relations are invariant under
the gauge transformations. Regardless of whether one believes in a fundamentally high-
dimensional space or a fundamentally low-dimensional space, the intrinsic account will
recover the wave function unique up to the gauge transformations (ψ ∼ Reiθψ).
I should emphasize that my intrinsic account of the wave function is essentially a
version of comparativism about quantities. As such, it should be distinguished from
eliminitivism about quantities. Just as a comparativist about mass does not eliminate
mass facts but ground them in comparative mass relations, my approach does not
eliminate wave function facts but ground them in comparative amplitude and phase
relations. My account does not in the least suggest any anti-realism about the wave
function.26
Therefore, my account removes a major obstacle for wave function realism. One
can use the intrinsic account of the quantum state to identify two field-like entities on
the configuration space (by thinking of the N-Regions as points in the 3N-dimensional
space) without committing to the excess structure of absolute amplitude and overall
phase.27
1.5 Conclusion
There are many prima facie reasons for doubting that we can ever find an intrinsic and
nominalistic theory of quantum mechanics. However, in this paper, we have offered an
intrinsic and nominalistic account of the quantum state, consisting in four relations on
regions of physical space:
1. Amplitude-Sum (S),
2. Amplitude-Geq (⪰A),
26Thanks to David Glick for suggesting that I make this clear.
27Unsurprisingly, the present account also provides some new arsenal for the defenders of the funda-
mental 3-dimensional space. The intrinsic account of the quantum state fleshes out some details in the
multi-field proposal.
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3. Phase-Congruence (∼P ),
4. Phase-Clockwise-Betweenness (CP ).
This account, I believe, offers a deeper understanding of the nature of the quantum
state that at the very least complements that of the standard account. By removing
the references to mathematical objects, our account of the quantum state provides a
framework for nominalizing quantum mechanics. By excising superfluous structure such
as overall phase, it reveals the intrinsic structure postulated by quantum mechanics.
Here we have focused on the universal quantum state. As the origin of quantum non-
locality and randomness, the universal wave function has no classical counterpart and
seems to resist an intrinsic and nominalistic treatment. With the focus on the univer-
sal quantum state, our account still leaves room for including additional ontologies of
particles, fields, mass densities supplied by specific solutions to the quantum measure-
ment problem such as BM, GRWm, and GRWf; these additional ontologies are readily
nominalizable.
Let us anticipate some directions for future research. First, the intrinsic structure
of the quantum state at different times is constrained by the quantum dynamics. In
the platonistic theory, the dynamics is described by the Schrödinger equation. To nom-
inalize the dynamics, we can decompose the Schrödinger equation into two equations,
in terms of amplitude and gradient of phase of the wave function. The key would be to
codify the differential operations (which Field has done for Newtonian Gravitation The-
ory) in such a way to be compatible with our phase and amplitude relations. Second, we
have described how to think of the quantum state for a system with constant number
of particles. How should we extend this account to accommodate particle creation and
annihilation in quantum field theories? I think the best way to answer that question
would be to think carefully about the ontology of a quantum field theory. A possible
interpretation is to think of the quantum state of a variable number of particles as being
represented by a complex valued function whose domain is ⋃∞N=0R3N—the union of all
configuration spaces (of different number of particles). In that case, the extension of
our theory would be easy: (1) keep the axioms as they are and (2) let the quantifiers
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range over K-regions, where the integer K ranges from zero to infinity. Third, we have
considered quantum states for spinless systems. A possible way to extend the present
account to accommodate spinorial degrees of freedom would be to use two comparative
relations for each complex number assigned by the wave function. That strategy is
conceptually similar to the situation in the present account. But it is certainly not the
only strategy, especially considering the gauge degrees of freedom in the spin space.
Fourth, as we have learned from debates about the relational theories of motion and
the comparative theories of quantities, there is always the possibility of a theory be-
coming indeterministic when drawing from only comparative predicates without fixing
an absolute scale.28 It would be interesting to investigate whether similar problems
of indeterminism arise in our comparative theory of the quantum state. Finally, the
formal results obtained for the periodic difference structure could be useful for further
investigation into the metaphysics of phase.
The nature of the quantum state is the origin of many deeply puzzling features of a
quantum world. It is especially challenging given realist commitments. I hope that the
account discussed in this paper makes some progress towards a better understanding
of it.




Our Fundamental Physical Space
Already in my original paper I stressed the circumstance that I was
unable to give a logical reason for the exclusion principle or to deduce
it from more general assumptions. I had always the feeling, and I still
have it today, that this is a deficiency.
Wolfgang Pauli (1946 Nobel Lecture)
Introduction
This is an essay about the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. In particular, it is about
the metaphysics of the quantum wave function and what it says about our fundamental
physical space.
To be sure, the discussions about the metaphysics within quantum mechanics have
come a long way. In the heyday of the Copenhagen Interpretation, Niels Bohr and
his followers trumpeted the instrumentalist reading of quantum mechanics and the
principles of complementarity, indeterminacy, measurement recipes, and various other
revisionary metaphysics. During the past three decades, largely due to the influential
work of J. S. Bell, the foundations of quantum mechanics have been much clarified and
freed from the Copenhagen hegemony.1 Currently, there are physicists, mathematicians,
and philosophers of physics working on solving the measurement problem by proposing
and analyzing various realist quantum theories, such as Bohmian mechanics (BM),
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory (GRW), and Everettian / Many-World Interpretation
as well as trying to extend them to the relativistic domains with particle creation and
1For good philosophical and historical analyses about this issue, see Bell (2004) for and Cushing
(1994).
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annihilation. However, with all the conceptual and the mathematical developments in
quantum mechanics (QM), its central object—the wave function—remains mysterious.
Recently, philosophers of physics and metaphysicians have focused on this difficult
issue. Having understood several clear solutions to the measurement problem, they
can clearly formulate their questions about the wave function and their disagreements
about its nature. Roughly speaking, there are those who take the wave function to
represent some mind-dependent thing, such as our ignorance; there are also people who
take it to represent some mind-independent reality, such as a physical object, a physical
field, or a law of nature.
In this paper, I shall assume realism about the wave function—that is, what the
wave function represents is something real, objective, and physical. (Thus, it is not
purely epistemic or subjective).2 I shall conduct the discussion in non-relativistic quan-
tum mechanics, noting that the lessons we learn here may well apply to the relativistic
domain.3 To disentangle the debate from some unfortunately misleading terminologies,
I shall adopt the following convention.4 I use the quantum state to refer to the physical
object and reserve the definite description the wave function for its mathematical rep-
resentation, Ψ. In the position representation (which I use throughout this paper), the
domain of the wave function is all the ways that fundamental particles can be arranged
in space and the codomain is the complex field C.5 (For convenience and simplicity,
2I take it that there are good reasons to be a realist about the wave function in this sense. One
reason is its important role in the quantum dynamics. See Albert (1996) and Ney (2012). The recently
proven PBR theorem lends further support for this position. See the original PBR paper Pusey et al.
(2012) and Matthew Leifer’s excellent review article Leifer (2014).
3See Myrvold (2014) for an insightful discussion on the complications when we transfer the discussion
to the relativistic domain with particle creation and annihiliation. I take it that a clear ontology of
QFT will provide a natural arena for conducting a similar debate. Since a consistent QFT is still an
incomplete work-in-progress (although an effective quantum field theory is highly useful and predictively
accurate, and there have been proposals with clearer ontology such as Bell-type QFT), I believe that
there are many values in conducting the discussion as below—in the non-relativistic QM—although we
know that it is only an approximation to the final theory. The clarity of the non-relativistic QM, if for
no other purposes, makes many issues more transparent.
4I am indebted to Maudlin (2013) for the following distinctions.
5It is reasonable to wonder whether our definition applies to “flashy” GRW (GRWf) or mass-density
versions of GRW (GRWm). Although particles are not fundamental in these theories, the definitions of
GRWf and GRWm and the mathematical structures of these theories can be captured by using wave
functions defined on the particle-location configuration space. When interpreting the physical theory
(either according to the low-dimensional view or the high-dimensional view described below), if we think
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I leave out spin when discussing the value of the wave function, noting that it can be
added as additional degrees of freedom (spinor values). Hence, Ψ ∈ L2(R3N ,C).) The
domain of the wave function is often called the configuration space, and it is usually
represented by R3N , whose dimension is 3 times N, where N is the total number of the
fundamental particles in the universe. (I shall represent the configuration space by R3N
instead of E3N , noting that the latter would be more physical than the former.) For
the wave function of a two-particle system in R3, the configuration space is R6. For the
wave function of our universe, whose total number of fundamental particles most likely
exceeds 1080, the configuration space has at least as many dimensions as 1080.
Our key question is: given realism about the quantum state, how is the configuration
space related to our familiar 3-dimensional space? There are, roughly speaking, two
views corresponding to two ways to answer that question.6
3N-Fundamentalism R3N represents the fundamental physical space in quantum me-
chanics. Our ordinary space, represented by R3, is less fundamental than and
stands in some grounding relations (such as emergence) to R3N .7
3D-Fundamentalism R3 represents the fundamental physical space in quantum me-
chanics. The configuration space, represented by R3N , is less fundamental than
of the wave function as representing something in addition to the material ontology, we can regard the
wave function space as having a structure that is independent from the material ontology (and the
configurations of material stuffs). We can call the domain of the wave function “the configuration
space,” but we do not need to understand it literally as the space of configurations of the material
ontology. How the material ontology is connected to the wave function on “the configuration space” is
explained by the definitions (such as the mass-density function m(x, t) in GRWm) and the dynamical
laws. Interpreted this way, many arguments that rely on the configuration space of particle locations,
including those in Sections 2 and 3, apply directly to GRWf and GRWm. The exceptions are those
arguments that rely on a justification or an explanation of the configuration space. Therefore, our
arguments in Section 4.2 apply most smoothly to theories with a particle ontology such as Bohmian
Mechanics and much less smoothly to GRW theories.
6I leave out the middle position between the two views, which says that both the 3N space and the
3D space are fundamental. See Dorr (2009) for an exploration of that view.
7This view is often called Wave Function Realism, although we should remember that this is un-
fortunately misleading terminology, for its opponents are also realists about the wave function. Under
my classification, 3N-Fundamentalists include David Albert, Barry Loewer, Alyssa Ney, Jill North,
and arguably, the time-slice of J. S. Bell that wrote “Quantum Mechanics for Cosmologists:” “No one
can understand this theory until he is willing to think of ψ as a real objective field rather than just a
‘probability amplitude’. Even though it propagates not in 3-space but in 3N-space.” (Bell (1987) p.128,
his emphasis.)
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and stands in some grounding relations (such as mathematical construction) to
R3.8
3N-Fundamentalism and 3D-Fundamentalism are the targets of the recent debates un-
der the name “The Metaphysics of the Wave Function,” “Wave Function Realism versus
Primitive Ontology,” and “Configuration Space Realism versus Local Beables.” (To be
sure, these debates often branch into discussions about other important issues, such as
the nature of the quantum state: whether Ψ is a field, a law, or a sui generis physical
object.) In those debates, the most common considerations include: (1) the dynamical
structure of the quantum theory, and (2) the role of our ordinary experiences. Usually,
the opposing thinkers are taken to assign different weights to these considerations.
For example, Jill North (2013) summarizes the disagreement as follows:
This brings us to a basic disagreement between wave function space and
ordinary space views: how much to emphasize the dynamics in figuring
out the fundamental nature of the world. Three-space views prioritize our
evidence from ordinary experience, claiming that the world appears three-
dimensional because it is fundamentally three-dimensional. Wave function
space views prioritize our inferences from the dynamics, claiming that the
world is fundamentally high-dimensional because the dynamical laws indi-
cate that it is.9
8This view is often taken to be a commitment to Primitive Ontology or Primary Ontology. Under
my classification, 3D-Fundamentalists include Bradley Monton, Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein, Nino
Zangh̀ı, Roderich Tumulka, James Taylor, Ward Struvye, Valia Allori, Tim Maudlin, Michael Esfeld,
CianCarlo Ghirardi, and Angelo Bassi. Depending on how one thinks about the nature of the wave
function, there are three ways to flesh out 3D-Fundamentalism: (1) the wave function is a physical
object—a multi-field (more later); (2) the wave function is nomological or quasi-nomological; (3) the
wave function is a sui generis entity in its own category. No matter how one fleshes out the view, the
following discussion should be relevant to all, although (1) is the most natural viewpoint to conduct
the discussion. In a companion paper, I discuss the viability of (2) in connection to David Lewis’s
thesis of Humean supervenience. In a future paper, I plan to discuss the viability of (3). In any
case, defending (2) and (3) takes much more work and might in the end decrease the plausibility of
3D-Fundamentalism. If the following discussion is right, since (1) is the most plausible competitor
with 3N-Fundamentalism with a high-dimensional field, it has been premature for 3D-Fundamentalists
to give up the defense of (1). Indeed, a careful examination of the pros and the cons reveals its
superiority over 3N-Fundamentalism (and its internal competitors (2) and (3)). I shall not defend this
claim here, and for this paper the reader does not need to take sides in this internal debate among
3D-Fundamentalists.
9North (2013), p. 196.
34
However, as I shall argue, the common arguments based on (1) and (2) are either
unsound or incomplete. Completing the arguments, it seems to me, render the overall
considerations based on (1) and (2) roughly in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. However,
there is another relevant consideration: (3) the deep explanations of striking phenom-
ena. Here, we find a more decisive argument in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism as it leads
to a deeper understanding of the mathematical symmetries in the wave function, known
as the Symmetrization Postulate. Since 3D-Fundamentalism explains the Symmetriza-
tion Postulate much better than 3N-Fundamentalism does, we have strong reasons to
accept 3D-Fundamentalism.
I shall argue that the considerations (1), (2), and (3), taken together, favors 3D-
Fundamentalism over 3N-Fundamentalism. Here is the roadmap. In §1, I shall argue,
against the 3N-Fundamentalist, that the common argument from the dynamical struc-
ture of quantum mechanics is unsound, and that after proper refinement it no longer
provides strong reason in favor of 3N-Fundamentalism. (As a bonus, I will provide
a direct answer to David Albert’s question to the primitive ontologists: what is their
criterion for something to be the fundamental physical space?) In §2, I shall argue,
against the typical 3D-Fundamentalist, that the common argument from the Manifest
Image can be resisted with spatial functionalism, but such a response can be weak-
ened by examining the details of the functionalist strategies. This suggests that the
argument from the Manifest Image, though no longer decisive, still has some force.
In §3, I shall explore which position leads to a better understanding of the physical
world and formulate a new argument based on the recent mathematical results about
the relationship between identical particles and the symmetries in the wave function.
The deeper topological explanation offered by 3D-Fundamentalism strongly suggests
that our fundamental physical space in a quantum world is 3-dimensional rather than
3N-dimensional.
Finally, I shall offer future directions of research, point out how a 3N-Fundamentalist
might be able to respond to the last two considerations, and offer additional expla-
nations to restore or reverse the evidential balance between 3D-Fundamentalism and
3N-Fundamentalism.
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As for the scope, this essay is more or less orthogonal to the debate between 3D
and 4D views about time and persistence. However, the analysis in this essay should
be of interest to participants in those debates as well as to philosophers working on
the nature of the quantum state, the fundamentality / emergence of space-time, and
mathematical explanation in physics. As we shall see, our case study also motivates
a particular way of understanding the equivalence of theories in terms of explanatory
equivalence.
2.1 Evidence #1: The Dynamical Structure of Quantum Mechanics
At first glance, 3N-Fundamentalism looks like a highly surprising idea. What can
possibly motivate such a revisionary metaphysical thesis? The initial motivation was
the reality of the non-local and non-separable quantum state and the phenomena of
quantum entanglement—causal influences that are unweakened by arbitrary spatial
separation. Perhaps what we see in front of us (the interference patterns on the screen
during the double-slit experiment), the idea goes, are merely projections from something
like a “Platonic Heaven”—some higher-dimensional reality on which the dynamics is
perfectly local.
The initial motivation leads to our first piece of evidence in the investigation of our
fundamental physical space. Such evidence is based on the dynamical laws and the
dynamical objects in quantum mechanics. This seems to be the strongest evidence in
favor of 3N-Fundamentalism. In this section, I suggest that the dynamical structure
of the quantum theory, under closer examination, does not support the view that the
fundamental physical space in quantum mechanics is 3N-dimensional.
2.1.1 The Argument for 3N-Fundametalism
Here is one way to write down the argument for 3N-Fundamentalism based on consid-
erations of the dynamics.10
10Strictly speaking, the following are based on considerations of both the kinematics and the dynamics
of the quantum theory. Nevertheless, the kinematical structure of the quantum wave function plays an
important role in determining the dynamics of the material ontology (Bohmian particles, mass densities,
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P1 We have (defeasible) reasons to infer a fundamental structure of the world that
matches the dynamical structure of our fundamental physical theory. [The Dy-
namical Matching Principle]
P2 The dynamical structure of quantum mechanics (a candidate fundamental physi-
cal theory) includes the quantum state which is defined over a 3N-dimensional
configuration space. [The 3N-Structure of the Quantum State]
C1 We have (defeasible) reasons to infer that our fundamental physical space is 3N-
dimensional.
P1—the Dynamical Matching Principle—follows from a more general principle of
inference from physical theories to metaphysical theories:
The Matching Principle We have (defeasible) reasons to infer a fundamental struc-
ture of the world that matches the structure of our fundamental physical theory.
We should infer no more and no less fundamental structure of the world than
what is needed to support the structure of our fundamental physical theory.
The Matching Principle can be a highly useful guide for empirically-minded metaphysi-
cians.11 For example, we can use it to infer that the classical space-time is Galilean
rather than Newtonian. This inference agrees with our intuitions. Moreover, the in-
ference is not based on controversial empiricist (perhaps verificationalist) assumptions
about eliminating unobservable or unverifiable structure.
2.1.2 The Assumptions in Premise 2
Suppose that something like the Matching Principle is true and the particular applica-
tion with the Dynamical Matching Principle is justified. Then the argument would rest
on P2. However, does the quantum state, represented by the wave function Ψ, really
etc) that move in the physical space.
11This principle comes from North (2013) and North (MS) (forthcoming). See also Albert (1996) and
Albert (2015) for ideas in a similar spirit.
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have a 3N-dimensional structure? In other words, does the wave function have to be
defined over a high-dimensional configuration space?
Many people would answer positively. How else can we define the wave function,
if not on a high-dimensional configuration space? For surely the wave function has
to take into account quantum systems with entangled subsystems that have non-local
influences on each other, which have to be represented by wave functions that are non-
separable. To take these into account, the usual reasoning goes, the wave function of an
N-particle system (say, our universe with 1080 particles), in general, has to be defined
as a field over on a 3N-dimensional space. Alyssa Ney (2012), for example, endorses
this line of reasoning:
...[Entangled] states can only be distinguished, and hence completely charac-
terized in a higher-than-3-dimensional configuration space. They are states
of something that can only be adequately characterized as inhabiting this
higher-dimensional space. This is the quantum wavefunction.12
North’s reasoning is similar:
In quantum mechanics, however, we must formulate the dynamics on a
high-dimensional space. This is because quantum mechanical systems can
be in entangled states, for which the wave function is nonseparable. Such
a wave function cannot be broken down into individual three-dimensional
wave functions, corresponding to what we think of as particles in three-
dimensional space. That would leave out information about correlations
among different parts of the system, correlations that have experimentally
observed effects. Only the entire wave function, defined over the entire high-
dimensional space, contains all the information that factors into the future
evolution of quantum mechanical systems.13
There are two assumptions that are worth making explicit in the above reasonings (to
be sure, North and Ney discuss them in their respective papers):
12Ney (2012), p. 556.
13North (2013), p. 190
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Ψ-as-a-Field The quantum state, represented by the wave function Ψ, is a field.
Field-Value-on-Points The space that a field “lives on” is the smallest space where
it assigns a value for each point in that space.
The two assumptions14 are explicit in David Albert’s argument in his important paper
“Elementary Quantum Metaphysics”:
The sorts of physical objects that wave functions are, on this way of thinking,
are (plainly) fields—which is to say that they are the sorts of objects whose
states one specifies by specifying the values of some set of numbers at every
point in the space where they live, the sorts of objects whose states one
specifies (in this case) by specifying the values of two numbers (one of which
is usually referred to as an amplitude, and the other as a phase) at every
point in the universe’s so-called configuration space.15
However, as I shall argue, there are good reasons to reject both assumptions.
To deny Ψ-as-a-Field, one might instead propose that Ψ is not strictly speaking
a field (in any classical sense). For example, an electromagnetic field assigns a field
value to every point in the 3-dimensional space, and the values are meaningful partly
because multiplying the field by a constant will result in a different field and different
dynamics. (The gauge freedom in the electric potential therefore indicates its relation to
something more physical and more fundamental, such as the electric field.16) However,
the quantum wave function, multiplied by a global phase factor (Ψ ⇒ eiθΨ), remains
physically the same. Insisting on Ψ-as-a-Field will lead one to recognize physically
indistinguishable features (that play no additional explanatory role) as physically real
and meaningful. It is desirable, therefore, that we do not recognize Ψ as a fundamental
field.17
14The qualification “smallest” is added to ensure that the principles render a unique space that a
field lives on.
15Albert (1996), p. 278
16Thanks to Michael Townsen Hicks for alerting me to the connection.
17However, it is possible to provide a gauge-free account of the wave function by giving a nominalistic
and intrinsic account of quantum mechanics. In a future paper, I will provide the beginning of such an
account. But the next point holds regardless of the success of that program.
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However, even if one were to embrace the indistinguishable features brought about
by Ψ-as-a-Field, one can still deny Field-Value-on-Points. We usually think, as
Albert describes, that the fundamental physical space is the fundamental space that
the dynamical object “lives on.” In particular, the fundamental space that a field lives
on is one in which we specify the state of the field at a time by specifying the values at
each point. This is indeed the case for the electromagnetic field. But why think that
this is an essential feature for a physical field?
Suppose that a fundamental field is mathematically represented by a function from
one space to another space. Such a function can be as general as one likes. A special
case, of course, is the electromagnetic field that assigns values to each point in R3.
But another one can be a quantum multi-field that assigns values to every N-tuple of
points in R3. That is, the function takes N arguments from R3. If we think of the
electromagnetic field as assigning properties to each point in R3, we can think of the
quantum multi-field as assigning properties to each plurality of N points in R3 (N-
plurality). The multi-field defined over N-pluralities of points in R3 is, unsurprisingly,
equivalent to the quantum wave function defined over each point in R3N . 18
However, this approach has a disadvantage. On this conception of the multi-field,
we lose Albert’s very clear criterion for something to be the fundamental physical space
(based on the space that the fundamental field “lives on”). Indeed, Albert asks,19 having
given up his criterion, what would be an alternative conception of the fundamental
physical space that the 3D-Fundamentalists can give?
No one, as far as I know, has provided an alternative criterion for something to be
the fundamental physical space. But would it be terrible if there were none? Some
people would not worry, for the following reason. When we work on the metaphysics
of physical theories, we have in mind complete physical theories—theories that specify
their fundamental physical spaces; that is, for each theory, we do not need to infer
18This approach of taking the wave function as a “multi-field” is explained in Forrest (1988) Ch.
6 and Belot (2012). I have heard that for many working mathematical physicists in the Bohmian
tradition, this has always been how they think about the wavefunction.
19Albert raised this question during his talk “On Primitive Ontology” at the 2014 Black Forest
Summer School in Philosophy of Physics.
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its fundamental space from the other parts of the theory. For each complete theory,
the fundamental space is given. Our task is to decide which one (among the complete
theories) is the best theory, by considering their theoretical virtues and vices (especially
their super-empirical virtues such as simplicity, parsimony, explanatory depth, and so
on). Albert’s question is not an urgent one, because it is about a different feature of
theories: how we arrive at them in the first place. We could wonder whether we have
inferred in the right way when we say that the fundamental space of the theory is 3-
dimensional. But we could also just ask which theory is more plausible: the quantum
theory defined on R3 or the quantum theory defined on R3N .
However, we might construe Albert’s question in a different way, as asking about a
distinctive theoretical virtue, namely, internal coherence. In contrast to the previous
construal, this perspective would make Albert’s worry highly relevant to the interpretive
projects in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. As I think of it, internal coherence
is distinct from logical consistency. A metaphysical / physical theory can be logically
consistent without being internally coherent, in the sense that it might contain theo-
retical parts that are in serious tension (though no logical incompatibility) with each
other. What the tension is can be precisified according to the types of the theory.
For example, a theory with a field-like entity defined not on individual points but on
non-trivial regions in the fundamental space has theoretical parts that are in tension.
Hence, one way for a theory to lack internal coherence is for it to fail Albert’s criterion
of Field-Value-on-Points.
Construed in that way, Field-Value-on-Points is a precisification of the theoretical
virtue of internal coherence. However, I shall argue that Albert’s argument against 3D-
Fundamentalism will not work even if internal coherence is a theoretical virtue, for
there is another equally valid way to precisify internal coherence.
Let us consider the following proposal for a first pass:
Field-Value-on-Pluralities The space that a field “lives on” is the smallest space
where it assigns values for pluralities of points in that space.
The modified criterion no longer requires the field to take on values at each point
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in the space. But this seems to lead to another disastrous consequence for the 3D-
Fundamentalist who holds the multi-field view, for the smallest space where it as-
signs values for a plurality of points is not R3 but R1 (a linear subspace of R3) where
3N fundamental particles move around (in a 1-dimensional space).20 Should the 3D-
Fundamentalist, based on the above criterion, accept R1 as the fundamental physical
space?
That initial worry dissolves itself if we take the particles to be indistinguishable and
physically identical, and we take the configuration space to be an unordered configu-
ration space (we will return to this proposal in §3). If the fundamental physical space
is R1, then two particles cannot pass through each other (see diagram below). For two
particles to pass through each other (which we would like to make possible given the
degrees of freedom of the particles in the 3D space and the complexity of our world),
there must be a moment in time where they occupy the same point, which means that
the wave function will be undefined at that moment. (Recall that we represent an un-
ordered configuration as a set instead of an ordered tuple, and that the wave function
is defined as functions from sets of N points in R3 to complex numbers. At the instant
where the two particles occupy the same point (as the following diagram in R1 shows),
the configuration will lose at least one point, dropping down to a configuration of 3N-1
points. The wave function would therefore be undefined.) However, things would be
different as soon as we go to a bigger space, say, R2. A particle can “pass through”
another by missing it by a small distance (such as particle 2* in the second diagram
below) or going around it, perhaps in a non-straight line, with arbitrarily small positive
distance 󰂃 (such as particle 2).21 Thus, the bigger space R2 provides more “expressive
power” than R1.
particle 1 particle 2
R1
20Thanks to David Albert for pointing out this worry.






Why not, then, take R2 instead of R3 as our fundamental physical space, since it is
also a linear subspace of R3? There are two reasons. First, we do not know whether
the total number of apparent particles in 3D space is even, which is required if the
fundamental dynamics is given by 3N/2 many particles in R2. However, we do know
(as the reader can easily verify) that the number of fundamental particles times the
dimensions of the fundamental space is a multiple of 3. It seems plausible that, at least
in the quantum theory, the fundamental physical space should remain neutral about
whether there are 2k or 2k − 1 particles. Second, even more than the dynamics of
3N particles in R1, the dynamics of 3N/2 many particles, especially the Hamiltonian
function, (even if we assume N is even) is unlikely to be natural.22 It is appropriate to
add a neutrality constraint and a naturality constraint to the previous criterion of the
fundamental physical space:
Field-Value-on-Pluralities* The space that a field “lives on” is the smallest and
most natural space that is neutral to the parity of the total number of fundamental
particles and that the field assigns values for pluralities of points in that space.
If we regard Albert’s question as tracking the theoretical virtue of what I call “internal
coherence,” then I take Field-Value-on-Pluralities* as an equally attractive way of pre-
cisifying internal coherence. Given this precisification, 3D-Fundamentalism wins, as R3
22There may be many other reasons why the 3-dimensional space is special. In §3.2, we consider
the case of identical particles, for which spaces with fewer than 3 dimensions would allow fractional
statistics that correspond to anyons, in addition to fermions and bosons.
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satisfies this criterion and is the space where the quantum multi-field lives on. With-
out offering strong reasons to favor his precisification, Albert’s argument falls short of
delivering the conclusion.
In this section, I have examined and improved the Argument against 3D-Fundamentalism
and still found its key premise unjustified. Therefore, our first piece of evidence from
the dynamical structure of quantum mechanics underdetermines our choice between
3N-Fundamentalism and 3D-Fundamentalism.
2.2 Evidence #2: Our Ordinary Perceptual Experiences
In this debate, many people have pointed out the obvious—our Manifest Image—the
tables, chairs, and experimental devices in front of us. How can these apparently 3-
dimensional objects exist if reality is vastly high-dimensional? If the high-dimensional
quantum mechanics could not explain the apparent reality of pointer readings in 3
dimensions, from which we come to be justified in believing in quantum mechanics, the
theory would surely be self-undermining.
Hence it is common for 3D-Fundamentalists to use the second piece of evidence—
our ordinary perceptual experiences—to argue in favor of their view. In this section, I
suggest that although the evidence seems to support their view over the alternative—
3N-Fundamentalism, the evidential force depends crucially on the fate of functionalism.
2.2.1 The Argument for 3D-Fundamentalism
Here is one way to write down the argument for 3D-Fundamentalism based on consid-
erations of the Manifest Image of 3-dimensional observers and pointers. (I shall use
relatively weak assumptions to generate a relatively strong argument.)
P3 If we cannot locate the Manifest Image of human observers and pointer readings
in an empirical (fundamental) scientific theory, then we have (defeasible) reasons
against that theory.
P4 We cannot locate the Manifest Image of human observers and pointer readings in
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the quantum theory with 3N-Fundamentalism, which is an empirical (fundamen-
tal) scientific theory.
C2 We have (defeasible) reasons against the quantum theory on 3N-Fundamentalism.
The first premise—P3—does not depend on an insistence of respecting the common
sense or the reality of the Manifest Image. Instead, it follows from a more general
principle:
Self-Undermining If we arrive at an empirical (fundamental) theory T based solely
on evidence E, and either we see that T entails that E is false without providing
a plausible error theory, or we see that T entails that our acquiring E is produced
by an unreliable process, or we see an ineliminable explanatory gap from T to
the truth of E (or some nearby propositions), then we have (defeasible) reasons
against T.
To see how P3 follows from Self-Undermining, we need to rewrite P3 in more precise
terms.
P3* If an empirical (fundamental) scientific theory contains an ineliminable explana-
tory gap for the true claims (or some nearby propositions) about human observers’
pointer readings after experiments, then we have (defeasible) reasons against that
theory.
P3* seems highly plausible.23 The key idea is that our belief in a fundamental
scientific theory is not justified in a void, or properly basic, or merely coherent with
respect to the rest of our metaphysical beliefs. Rather, we are justified in believing in it
because we (or the scientific community as a whole) have acquired sufficient empirical
evidence through the pointer readings connected to particular experimental set-ups.
These pointer readings can be in principle reduced to the positions of entities in a 3-
dimensional space. And we acquire such crucial pieces of evidence through perception
23This is similar to the demand for “empirical coherence” in Barrett (1999) and Healey (2002). The
principle, I take it, is weaker than the often cited principle in Maudlin (2007b) that the physical theory
makes contact with evidence via “local beables.” Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) discuss, in light of the
recent developments of quantum gravity and string theory, the complications of that requirement.
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and testimony. Each person in the society may not acquire the evidence in a direct
way. However, there has to be some direct perception of the 3-dimensional recordings
of the positions that justifies our beliefs in the scientific theory. That is, we come to
believe in the scientific theory on the basis of our observations about the arrangement
of macroscopic objects in the 3-dimensional space. Now, if the scientific theory cannot
explain the truth of such observations of pointer readings, or if it turns out that we
would be systematically wrong about the arrangements of these macroscopic objects in
the 3-dimensional space, then we acquire an undermining defeater: the theory suggests
that our evidence for the theory is false. This is especially objectionable for scientific
theories that attempt to give a comprehensive explanation for the empirical world that
includes the human observers, pointers, and laboratory set-ups.
2.2.2 The Assumptions in Premise 4
If we accept P3*, then the success of the argument depends on the second premise—
P4. P4 is the claim that we cannot find the Manifest Image of human observers and
pointer readings in the quantum theory on 3N-Fundamentalism. In other words, there
is an ineliminable explanatory gap for the true claims (or some nearby propositions)
about human observers’ position readings of the experimental set-ups.
Many people sympathetic to 3D-Fundamentalism take this premise to be straight-
forward.24 However, 3N-Fundamentalists have offered a proposal about how to close
the explanatory gap. Their general strategy goes by the name of “functionalism.”25
In our context here, “functionalism” refers to a formulation of the sufficient condition
for what counts as emergent and real objects:
Functionalism If we have a fundamental theory of the world in which we can de-
fine a mapping from the fundamental degrees of freedom to Q1,Q2, ...Qn, and
24See, for example, Allori (2013) and Maudlin (2013).
25It is different from functionalism in philosophy of mind, as it is concerned not with minds but
macroscopic physical objects, but the two theories have interesting similarities that are worth exploring
further.
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Q1,Q2, ...Qn have the same counterfactual profile of what we take to be the con-
stituents of the Manifest Image, then Q1,Q2, ...Qn are real, emergent entities from
that fundamental theory and our discourse about the Manifest Image is made true
by the fundamental theory via the functionalist mapping.26
More specifically, we take the 3N-Fundamentalist to be adopting the following sufficient
condition:
Functionalism about pointers If we have a fundamental theory of the world in
which we can define a mapping from the fundamental degrees of freedom to
Q1,Q2, ...Qn, and Q1,Q2, ...Qn have the same counterfactual profile of what we
take to be the 3-dimensional pointers in the Manifest Image, then Q1,Q2, ...Qn
are real, emergent entities from that fundamental theory and our discourse about
pointer readings is made true by the fundamental theory via the functionalist
mapping.
Three questions arise. First, can we find such a mapping? Answer: yes, it is avail-
able to the 3N-Fundamentalist. The most obvious solution would be to choose just
the three degrees of freedom associated with each apparent particle from which we
construct the configuration space. The 3-dimensional particles are not fundamental,
but we recognize that there is a mapping from the 3N-dimensional space to N particles
in the 3-dimensional space. Therefore, our discourse about the pointers and human
observers that are made out of particles in the 3-dimensional space is grounded via the
functionalist mapping from the fundamental picture (in the Bohmian 3N picture: one
Marvelous Point moving in a high-dimensional space).
Second, is the mapping unique? Answer: it depends. We can, for example, use the
dynamical structure to privilege one set of mappings. Albert (1996) takes this strategy
26Thanks to an anonymous referee, I realize that this definition of functionalism leaves open the
question how to understand the notion of “counterfactual profiles” in certain theories. Take GRWm
for example: when we evaluate a counterfactual situation by changing the mass densities within a
bounded spatial region R, it is not at all clear how we should change the mass densities outside of R or
how we should change the wave function to reflect the changes in the mass densities as the mappings
are many-to-one. There may be some ways to handle this worry (and we invite the defenders of 3N-
Fundamentalism to address this worry), but the referee is right that it raises another sort of worry on
the viability of the functionalist program.
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and suggests that there is a uniquely preferred mapping because of the contingent struc-












Vj,k([(x3j−2 − x3k−2)2 + (x3j−1 − x3k−1)2 + (x3j − x3k)2])
The idea is that the fundamental degrees of freedom are contingently grouped into
triples in the Hamiltonian potential term, instantiating a relation just like the familiar
Pythagorean distance relation, which gives rise to the 3-dimensional Euclidean metric.
Each triple is what we take to be a particle in the 3-dimensional space. Even in
a classical world, the Pythagorean distance relation gives rise to a structure that is
invariant under rotation, translation, and reflection symmetries, and grounds our claims
about the 3-dimensional space. In a relativisitic world, the Minkowski metric, according
to many people, gives rise to a genuinely 4-dimensional spacetime:
d(a, b)2 = −(cδt)2 + (δx)2 + (δy)2 + (δz)2
Therefore, the reasoning goes, the mathematical structure in the Hamiltonian po-
tential term gives rise to an emergent, distinguished, and invariant structure of 3-
dimensionality—R3—that grounds our discourse about pointer readings and human
observers. Moreover, the Hamiltonian, in a unique way, puts the fundamental degrees
of freedom into Ω󳆋3 triples.
Third, isn’t the sufficient condition too permissive? If what suffices to be emer-
gent and real is just to stand in a mathematical mapping relation to the fundamental
dynamical objects, then (as Tim Maudlin27 and John Hawthorne28 observe indepen-
dently) there will be many more emergent objects than we realize, a consequence that
is highly implausible. Under Functionalism, simply by defining a mathematical map-
ping from the location of every object in the world to three feet north of that object,
there will be emergent objects interacting with other emergent objects unbeknown to
27Personal communication February 2015.
28See Hawthorne (2010), pp.147-152.
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all of us! Since the 3-feet-north mapping is completely arbitrary, there will be infinitely
many mappings, each of which will realize a different set of emergent entities. As a
consequence, just by defining trivial mappings like these, we can create metaphysical
monstrosities of an unimaginable scale.
The 3-feet-north objection is a special case of a general objection to structuralism
and functionalism: the mere existence of certain structure, counterfactual dependence,
or causal relations is sometimes insufficient ground for establishing the reality of the
emergent entities. In our context, the 3-feet-north objection suggests that the function-
alist criterion is insufficient, and hence the proposed mapping from the fundamental
degrees of freedom in 3N-Fundamentalism does not explain the pointers or observers in
the 3-dimensional space.
I see two potential responses. First, the 3N-Fundamentalist can bite the bullet,
embrace the seemingly absurd consequence of the functionalist criterion, and include in
her ontology infinitely many sets of emergent entities. To show that the consequences
are tolerable, she can give an argument that shows that all sets of emergent entities
are in fact equivalent in some way. One obvious argument makes use of relationalism
about space. If relationalism is true, then there is no container (the substantial space)
in addition to spatial relations among objects. Take any set of emergent entities (for
example, the emergent entities that are 3 feet north of everything in the world), the
spatial relations instantiated among them are the same spatial relations instantiated in
any other set (for example, the emergent entities that are 5 feet west of everything in
the world). The sets of emergent entities related by such mappings are just different
ways of describing the same relational world. Call this The Relationalist Approach.
The Relationalist Approach, I think, is the most promising response on behalf of the
3N-Fundamentalist. However, it faces a problem. Functionalism, if true, seems to be
a necessary truth. Relationalism, on the other hand, does not seem to be a necessary
truth. The mere possibility of the failure of relationalism implies that there are possible
worlds in which the functionalist criterion generates too many emergent entities. Since
those possible worlds are not too remote, our modal intuitions seem robust enough to
account for them. The metaphysical monstrosity seems highly implausible. So it seems
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that Functionalism is still false. At this point, the 3N-Fundamentalist can reply
that Functionalism is in fact a contingent truth that holds only among relational
worlds. It would take future work to show why this is true or how it follows from other
commitments of Functionalism.
Instead of suggesting that the thesis is contingent, the 3N-Fundamentalist can reply
that there are ways of restricting the functionalist criterion such that it does not lead to
the absurd consequences. One way to restrict the criterion is to say that the functionalist
mapping has to be an identity mapping.29 The reason that projection mappings from
R3N to R3 are insufficient is that a projection map composed with a spatial translation
is another a projection map; since the spatial translamtion can be completely arbitrary,
there will be an infinite number of projection mappings that are equally good. However,
if we let the functionalist relation to be the identity mapping, we can eliminate this
problem. Applied to our case, the relation takes the triplets of degrees of freedom
in the configuration space as identical with the 3-dimensional particles. For example,
take the Bohmian “marvelous point” in the 3N-dimensional configuration space: its
coordinates x1, y1, z1 just are a 3-dimensional particle. Identity is a strict relation that
is not preserved by arbitrary mappings. Neither does the strategy rely on relationalism
about space. Call this The Identity Approach.
However, not only does it have difficulty extending to GRW theories, the Identity
Approach gets rid of the metaphysical monstrosities at the expense of eliminating the
Manifest Image altogether. To see this, let us borrow some idioms from the grounding
literature. The grounding relation, as commonly conceived,30 is an umbrella term
for several kinds of metaphysical dependence relations. One widely-accepted feature of
grounding is that if a set of facts or entities, Σ, grounds another set of facts or entities Γ,
then it is not the case that Γ grounds Σ. Such an asymmetry is a defining feature of the
grounding relation. If the particles and their electromagnetic interactions ground the
existence of a table, it is not the case that the table’s existence grounds the particles and
their electromagnetic interactions. Let us examine the suggestion that the functionalist
29Barry Loewer suggests this in personal communication, but he does not necessarily endorse it.
30For example, see Rosen (2010).
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mapping has to be an identity mapping. As I understand it, the functionalist mapping
is a metaphysical dependence relation that falls under the umbrella of the grounding
relation. Hence, the mapping has to be asymmetric. However, the identity relation
is symmetric. We have arrived at a contradiction. Therefore, one of the assumptions
has to go. Since the functionalist mapping is supposed to metaphysically explain the
emergence of 3-dimensional objects such as pointers and observers, it is best understood
as a metaphysical explanation relation that is asymmetric. So it seems to me that the
3N-Fundamentalist should reject the suggestion that the functionalist criterion only
allows identity mappings.
There is another way to restrict the functionalist criterion. Instead of counting
mathematical mappings of any sort, a 3N-Fundamentalist can restrict to mappings
between different spaces. For this smaller class of mathematical mappings, the 3-feet-
north counterexamples do not arise, for the dynamics and causal behaviors on different
levels are likely to be quite different. Call this The Different Space Approach.
In addition to being obviously ad hoc and unprincipled, the Different Space Approach
does not block composite mappings. The composite mappings first from R3N to R3
then from R3 to itself are not ruled out by the restriction and still generate the same
counterexamples.
The above discussions of different approaches of functionalism—the Relationalist
Approach, the Identity Approach, and the Different Space Approach—suggest that the
current functionalist criterion is too permissive and leads to disastrous results for the
3N-Fundamentalists. Thus, we are right to doubt whether there can be any principled
way to close the apparent explanatory gap in 3N-Fundamentalism. However, Func-
tionalism, just like Structuralism, is still being developed, and its application here is
novel and potentially promising. Given the recent work on the emergence of space-time
and structural realism, there may well be future work that suggests better proposals
than the ones we have considered. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many philosophers
are not deterred by the above counterexamples and are still searching for some version
of Functionalism that closes the explanatory gap in a principled way.
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So far our discussions have focused on the two main considerations in the literature:
the dynamical structure of the quantum theory and the successful explanation of the
Manifest Image. If I am right, then the common arguments based on these considera-
tions are either unsound or in need of refinement. After locating the crucial premises,
I show how they can be resisted on either side. While the 3D-Fundamentalist can
respond line by line by giving an alternative criterion of fundamental physical space,
the 3N-Fundamentalist cannot provide a satisfactory functionalist criterion. So far, the
considerations based on the dynamical structure and the Manifest Image are roughly in
favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that this has not
persuaded many 3N-Fundamentalists to switch sides, as they are often inclined to bite
the bullet and swallow the costs of counter-intuitiveness.
I take this to suggest that the most common philosophical arguments do not fully
settle the debate between the two views. It looks like we have reached a stalemate.
However, I suggest that we have not. In the next section, by looking into which view
leads to a deeper understanding of the quantum world, I argue that we can find a new
class of powerful arguments that favor 3D-Fundamentalism over 3N-Fundamentalism.
2.3 Evidence #3: Mathematical Symmetries in the Wave Function
Having seen that the common arguments from the dynamical structure and ordi-
nary experiences do not fully settle the debate between 3D-Fundamentalism and 3N-
Fundamentalism, I suggest we look at the debate from a different angle. As we are
examining scientifically motivated metaphysical positions, we would like to see which
one leads to a better or deeper understanding of the scientific phenomena. In this sec-
tion, I offer an argument for 3D-Fundamentalism on the basis that it provides a deeper
mathematical explanation of certain symmetries in the quantum theory. Since I do
not take this to be the final word on the issue, I offer this as a first step toward an
open research program to explore various mathematical explanations31 in the quantum
theories.
31Here I do not take sides whether such mathematical explanations are non-causal explanations.
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2.3.1 Another Argument for 3D-Fundamentalism
P5 If a fundamental theory T explains S while T’ does not, and S should be explained
rather than postulated (other things being equal), then we have (defeasible) rea-
sons to infer that T is more likely than its alternative to be the fundamental
theory.
P6 3D-Fundamentalism explains the Symmetrization Postulate but 3N-Fundamentalism
does not.
P7 The Symmetrization Postulate should be explained rather than postulated.
C3 We have (defeasible) reasons to infer that 3D-Fundamentalism is more likely to be
the fundamental theory than 3N-Fundamentalism.
The first premise—P5—seems to me highly plausible. When we compare two funda-
mental theories, we measure them not just by empirical adequacy and internal coherence
but also by explanatory depth. Say that a theory T provides a deeper explanation for
X than T’ does if T explains X from its axioms and T’ postulates X as an axiom.
For example, if a fundamental physical theory T says that the Symmetrization
Postulate is true (there are two groups of fundamental particles and one group has
symmetric wave functions and the other group has anti-symmetric wave functions), if
(other things being equal) we would like to understand why that is the case, and if
we find out that its alternative S provides an explanation for that fact, then we have
defeasible reasons to favor S over T.
2.3.2 Justifying Premise 6
If we accept P5, then the success of the argument depends on P6 and P7. It is
important to note that P6 is not the unique premise that delivers the conclusion.
There probably are many mathematical explanations that favor 3D-Fundamentalism
over 3N-Fundamentalism, including Lorentz symmetry.32 (Indeed, I take it to be an
32For example, see Allori (2013), pp. 72-73.
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open research question whether there are good mathematical explanations that support
3N-Fundamentalism. To be sure, what counts as a good explanation and what counts
as something that should be explained can be controversial.)
In any case, P6 focuses on a particular mathematical explanation that arises from
the mathematical study of identical particles and the nature of their configuration
space.33 34
Roughly speaking, identical particles share the same intrinsic physical properties,
that is, the same qualitative properties recognized by the physical theory. For exam-
ple, all electrons can be regarded as identical (which in this context means physically
indistinguishable) since they have the same charge, mass, and spin. (To be sure, their
different positions in space cannot correspond to their intrinsic properties, for if nothing
else they would not be able to move.) Suppose we take the ordinary configuration space
R3N for N electrons. Then the configuration space is ordered:
(x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2, ..., xn, yn, zn)
Each point in the configuration space is an ordered 3N-tuple and can be read as the
x, y, z coordinates of electron 1, those of electron 2, those of electron 3, and all the way
up to the x, y, z coordinates of electron N. The numeral labels provide names (and thus
distinguishability) to the electrons. Therefore, the configuration in which electron 1 and
electron 2 are exchanged will be a different configuration and hence will be represented
by a different point in the configuration space.
However, the distinct points resulting from permutations of the electrons do not
give rise to any real physical differences recognized by the physical laws. If we were
to have the simplest ontology supporting the laws of quantum mechanics (or indeed
any atomistic theory, including the Democritean atomism and classical mechanics), we
should have a physical space representing all and only the real physical differences,
excluding differences resulting from permutations of identical particles. Therefore, we
33In writing this section, I am grateful for many extensive discussions with Sheldon Goldstein and
Roderich Tumulka about their papers on the Symmetrization Postulate.
34I do not include this explanation in the “inferences from the dynamics” category, for it concerns
the mathematical construction of the theory.
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can introduce the notion of an unordered configuration space for N particles in 3-
dimensional space as:
NR3 ∶= {S ⊂ R3󳈌 cardinality(S) = N}
So a point in this configuration space would be:
{(x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2), ..., (xn, yn, zn)}
Notice that the points are not 3N-tuples but sets of N elements, which are unordered
(given the extensionality axiom of ZF set theory). In fact, it is a set of tuples, but the
ordering corresponds to the coordinatization of the 3-dimensional space, which can be
ultimately eliminated by using E3 instead of R3.
Even in classical mechanics, we can use the unordered configuration space NR3
(or the relevant unordered phase space) instead of the ordered configuration space
R3N . Such a choice would not lead to any physical differences, as the two spaces share
the same local properties. They differ, however, in their global topological properties,
which become essential in quantum mechanics. In particular, NR3 (like the circle S1) is
topologically non-trivial in that it is not simply-connected, as not every closed loop is
contractible to a point, while R3N (like the real line R1) is simply connected—a much
more trivial topology. As we will explain below, their global topological differences allow
us to derive the deep and useful principle known as the Symmetrization Postulate.
Conventionally, a quantum theory with wave functions defined over an ordered con-
figuration space needs to postulate an additional requirement—the Symmetrization
Postulate—to rule out certain types of particles. It says that there are only two kinds
of particles: symmetric wave functions for bosons and anti-symmetric wave functions
for fermions. The “symmetry” and “anti-symmetry” refer to the behavior of the wave
functions under position exchange. Stated for particles in 3-dimensions:
Symmetrization Postulate: There are only two kinds of wave functions:
(Bosons) ψB(xσ(1), ...,xσ(N)) = ψB(x1, ...,xN),
(Fermions) ψF (xσ(1), ...,xσ(N)) = (−1)σψF (x1, ...,xN),
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where σ is a permutation of {1,2, ...,N} in the permutation group SN , (−1)σ
denotes the sign of σ, xi ∈ R3 for i = 1,2, ...,N.
This is an extremely deep and highly useful principle. To have a more intuitive grasp
of it, we can recall the more familiar Pauli Exclusion Principle, which says that no
two electrons can occupy the same quantum state (usually characterized by quantum
numbers). For one direction of implication, consider two electrons (fermions) with a
wave function that is totally anti-symmetric under position exchange. It follows that
they cannot occupy the same position, that is:
∀x1, x2 ∈ R3,ψ(x1, x2) = −ψ(x2, x1)󲿎⇒∀x ∈ R3,ψ(x,x) = 0
Surprisingly, the Symmetrization Postulate, being deep and useful, emerges as a
result of a beautiful mathematical analysis about the topological properties of the un-
ordered configuration space.35 Here we sketch only an outline of the derivation; we
refer interested readers to the Appendix B for more technical details.
Let us take Bohmian Mechanics (BM) as the background theory, in which there
really are particles with precise trajectories, guided by a universal wave function. (Let us
use scalar-valued wave functions to avoid further technicalities. We will later return to
the question whether such an explanation is available on the Copenhagen intepretation
and GRW theories.) In BM, the universal wave function evolves according to the
Schrödinger equation, and particles move according to the universal wave function and
the guidance equation. The configuration space for N identical particles in R3 is NR3,
not R3N . However, they are intimately related. In fact, R3N is what is called the
“universal covering space” of NR3. There is a natural projection mapping from R3N
to NR3 that forgets the ordering of particles. Since the physical configuration lies in
NR3, the velocity field needs to be defined there, whereas the wave function can still
very well be defined on R3N , as we can project its velocity field from R3N to the NR3.
However, not every velocity field can be so projected. To ensure that it can , we impose
35For the classic papers in the mathematical physics literature, see Dowker (1972) and Leinaas and
Myrheim (1977). But Dürr et al. (2006) and Dürr et al. (2007) carry out the explanation much more
thoroughly and successfully in Bohmian mechanics. The outline in the next paragraph is a summary
of their more technical derivation in the case of scalar wave functions.
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a natural “periodicity condition” on the wave function on R3N :
∀q̂ ∈ R3N ,σ ∈ SN ,ψ(σq̂) = γσψ(q̂).
Since the fundamental group SN is a finite group, the topological factor γσ has to
be a group character (see Unitarity Theorem in Appendix B). But SN has only
two characters: (1) the trivial character γσ = 1 and (2) the alternating character γσ =
sign(σ) = 1 or − 1 depending on whether σ ∈ SN is an even or an odd permutation.
The former corresponds to the symmetric wave functions of bosons and the latter to
the anti-symmetric wave functions of fermions. Since any other topological factors
are banned, we have ruled out other types of particles such as anyons. This result is
equivalent to the Symmetrization Postulate.
We have seen that given some natural assumptions about identical particles in R3,
the unordered configuration space NR3, and a globally well-defined velocity field, we
have very easily arrived at an explanation for the Symmetrization Postulate. With
Bohmian Mechanics in the background, the derivation is well-motivated at each step.
The rigorous mathematical work is done by Bohmian researchers in two beautiful papers
Dürr et al. (2006) and Dürr et al. (2007), of which the above discussion is a simplification
(of the simple case of scalar-valued wave functions). (For technical details, please see
Appendix B.)
The above explanation might still work in the context of standard textbook quan-
tum mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation, according to which we should not
take it seriously that particles are things that have precise locations and velocities si-
multaneously. Usually, in this context, we are told to act as if there are particles and
to construct various mathematical objects from the degrees of freedom of the particles
(such as the use of the configuration space). From a foundational point of view, it is
not clear why the configuration space should be useful in such a theory. But if we play
the usual game of acting as if there are particles, perhaps we can also act as if they
are really identical, as if their states are given by a point in the unordered configura-
tion space, and as if the above assumptions in the Bohmian theory are also justified
in this theory. Indeed, this seems to be the implicit attitude taken in two pioneer
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studies—Dowker (1972) and Leinaas and Myrheim (1977)—about quantum mechanics
for identical particles and unordered configuration space.
What about other solutions to the measurement problem, such as GRWm (a spon-
taneous collapse theory with a mass-density ontology)? Since its fundamental material
ontology consists in a mass-density field (not particles) in the 3-dimensional space, it
is unclear why we should use the configuration space of particle locations. However,
usually the wave function and the mass-density field are defined with the help of the
configuration space. 36 Nevertheless, it seems inconsistent with the spirit of GRWm
to act as if there are fundamental particles or as if the above-mentioned Bohmian as-
sumptions hold in the theory. In particular, there do not seem to be any compelling
reasons to consider NR3, a crucial piece in the above derivation, unlike in the case
of BM. Hence, we do not think that the previous argument applies smoothly to the
case of GRW theories or the Many-Worlds interpretation with a mass-density ontol-
ogy.37 Unlike the arguments in the previous sections, the argument we offer here does
depend on the specific interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely Bohmian Mechan-
ics. Whether we can make similar topological arguments in the context of GRW and
MWI would require thinking more deeply about the structures of their state spaces.
(This stands in contrast with the situation in §1 and §2, where the arguments do not
require a justification of the structure of the configuration space.)
Returning to the construction of the unordered configuration space NR3, we observe
that it stands in a special relation to R3, namely, mathematical construction. In this
sense, a quantum system of N-identical-particles in R3 naturally give rise to NR3, which
in turn naturally give rise to the mathematical explanation of the Symmetrization
Postulate.
36For example, when defining the mass-density function at a time t, we start with a 󳈌Ψt󳈌2-distribution
in the particle-location configuration space R3N , and obtain the value by using the marginal distribution
weighted by the particle masses and summing over all particle degrees of freedom:








3(xi − x)󳈌Ψt(x1, ..., xN)󳈌2
37We thank an anonymous referee for helping us make this clear.
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However, this explanation is not available for the quantum theory on 3N-Fundamentalism.
Although in the above explanation we use R3N in defining the wave function (as it is
the universal covering space of NR3), simply starting with R3N gets us nowhere near
to the characters of the permutation group. Starting with a wave function and a “mar-
velous point” (the only fundamental particle) on R3N , we do not have any motivation
to consider NR3, the natural configuration space for N particles in R3. Consequently,
we cannot make use of its explanatory power in the derivation of the Symmetrization
Postulate. (That is because, given a particle moving in R3N , we do not have any mo-
tivation to use the covering-space construction to derive the topological factors of the
wave function, and we do not have an explanation for the Symmetrization Postulate.)
Therefore, we have justified P6—the second premise in the argument.
2.3.3 Deep versus Shallow Explanations
What about P7, the idea that the Symmetrization Postulate should be explained rather
than postulated?38 Here are some compelling reasons to endorse it:
• Its form is very different from the other laws of QM such as the Schrödinger
equation. It is a direct restriction on the possible quantum states of systems with
indistinguishable particles.
• It has high explanatory power. The Symmetrization Postulate explains Pauli’s
Exclusion Principle and the Periodic Table. It also explains why there are exactly
two kinds of particles in QM.
• In the words of Pauli, at the occasion of his 1946 Nobel Lecture, as quoted in the
epigraph: “Already in my original paper I stressed the circumstance that I was
38P7 shows the difference between my argument here and Maudlin’s argument in Maudlin (2013)
pp.140-42. The difference in our arguments lies in our use of different explananda. Maudlin suggests
that for, say, an 8-particle universe, the natural configuration space is 8R3 instead of R24, but that
cries out for an explanation: why is this particular space 8R3 the fundamental space instead of some
other space with a different factorization of 24 (such as 4R6)? This is an insightful argument, but I do
not think it would convince many defenders of 3N-Fundamentalism, as on their view the fundamental
space does not need further explanation. In contrast, our argument is quite different: we are not asking
for an explanation of the fundamental space, but for an explanation of the Symmetrization Postulate,
something that everyone agrees to be a deep and puzzling symmetry in quantum mechanics. Thus, I
include Pauli’s quote as it beautifully conveys the deep puzzlement.
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unable to give a logical reason for the exclusion principle or to deduce it from
more general assumptions. I had always the feeling, and I still have it today, that
this is a deficiency.”39
Granted, one might still deny P7 at this point. But it seems to me (and to many
working physicists) that P7 is much more likely to be true than its denial. The above
reasons suggest that an explanation of P7 would point us to something deep in the
physical nature of the world. It is true that in an ultimately axiomatic theory of physics,
the explanatory relations can be reversed (just as logical theories can be axiomatized
in different ways corresponding to different explanatory relations). However, I think
it is reasonable to believe that the final quantum theory ought not to postulate the
Symmetrization Postulate as fundamental but rather as something that follows from
simpler axioms.
2.3.4 What about NR3-Fundamentalism?
In this essay, I have assumed that the 3N-Fundamentalist is really a R3N -Fundamentalist.
She can of course modify her thesis and believe instead in a fundamentally multiply-
connected physical space, NR3. The 3D-Fundamentalist can respond by charging her
opponent’s move as ad hoc or unnatural, since NR3 is “clearly” about N identical par-
ticles in R3. But similar criticisms have not prevented anyone from taking R3N as





There is, however, another argument against the 3N-Fundamentalist’s maneuver
that is even less controversial. My main goal in this paper has been to evaluate
39Pauli et al. (1994), p.171.
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the evidential support for 3D-Fundamentalism and 3N-Fundamentalism. Given 3N-
Fundamentalism, the fundamental physical space has two main possibilities: (1) a
simply-connected space R3N and (2) a multiply-connected space that is a quotient
space of R3N by the permutation group of k objects where k divides 3N . I believe that
(1) is intrinsically more likely than (2). But suppose we grant them equal probability.
Still, (2) comes in many further possibilities, and NR3 is intrinsically as likely as any
other quotient space. So we should assign equal probability to each possibility in (2).
Given a large N , NR3 will receive a very small probability compared to that of R3N .40
In the table above, the ratio of the two areas for R3N and NR3 roughly corresponds to
the relative confidence that we have in them.
Given 3D-Fundamentalism, there is only one main candidate for the fundamental
physical space–R3 and two main candidates for the configuration space–R3N and NR3.
Although an ontology of identical particles is simpler than that of non-identical par-
ticles, for the sake of the argument, we can give these two possibilities equal weight.
Hence, in the table above, the two candidates divide the area roughly in half.
If we take as a datum that the Symmetrization Postulate is true, assume that
NR3 is the correct route to explain it, and we allow explanatory strength to come
in degrees, then overall (considering all versions) 3D-Fundamentalism explains it bet-
ter than 3N-Fundamentalism does. So although both 3D-Fundamentalism and 3N-
Fundamentalism contain versions of them that explain the Symmetrization Postulate,
3D-Fundamentalism is better supported by the successful explanation. Therefore, the
evidence “disconfirms” 3N-Fundamentalism over 3D-Fundamentalism. (That is, if we
assume a standard way of thinking about update and Bayesian confirmation theory.41)
In fact, we can reformulate the original argument by replacing P6 with a weaker
premise:
40Thanks to Gordon Belot for helpful discussions here.
41In a different context (the problem of evil) at the Rutgers Religious Epistemology Workshop in
May 2014, Lara Buchak discussed a different approach to rational updating—updating by conditionals.
It is up to the defender of 3N-Fundamentalism to develop and apply that approach here. Even if
that were to succeed, however, I think it would be a significant concession that 3N-Fundametnalism is
disconfirmed in the “Bayesian” sense.
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P6* 3D-Fundamentalism explains the Symmetrization Postulate significantly better
than 3N-Fundamentalism.
Therefore, even if NR3-Fundamentalism is an option for the 3N-Fundamentalism, her
view is still not well supported by the explanation. The above argument fleshes out our
intuition that the 3N-Fundamentalist maneuver is ad hoc or unnatural.
However, this should reflect only our current state of knowledge and should not be
taken as the final word on the issue. Indeed, there are several ways that future research
can go:
1. We discover more mathematical explanations only available to 3D-Fundamentalism,
which gives us more reason to favor 3D-Fundamentalism over 3N-Fundamentalism.
2. We discover some mathematical explanations only available to 3N-Fundamentalism,
which restores or reverses the evidential balance between 3D-Fundamentalism and
3N-Fundamentalism.
3. We discover that there exists a mathematical explanation of the Symmetrization
Postulate from other resources in 3N-Fundamentalism that is independent from
the topological considerations as discussed above, which restores the evidential
balance between 3D-Fundamentalism and 3N-Fundamentalism.
Considerations 3D-Fundamentalism 3N-Fundamentalism
Dynamics 0/+ +
Manifest Image + -/0
Explanatory Depth + -/0
2.4 Conclusion
Based on the above evaluation of the three kinds of evidence (see Table 1, a summary of
pros and cons, where “+” means “strongly in favor,” “-” means “strongly against,” and
“0” means “roughly neutral.”), I conclude that, given our current knowledge, it is more
likely that the fundamental physical space in quantummechanics is 3-dimensional rather
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than 3N-dimensional. However, as noted above, there are future directions of research
where the 3N-Fundamentalists can restore or even reverse the evidential balance.
Our debate here is related to the discussions about theoretical equivalence; we ob-
serve the following:
1. 3N-Fundamentalism and 3D-Fundamentalism are highly equivalent in theoretical
structure–the mathematics used is exactly the same;
2. The debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists almost reaches
a stalemate and hence might be considered as non-substantive;
3. An important new piece of evidence lies not in the inferences from the dynamics
or ordinary experiences but in the mathematical symmetries in the wave function.
What breaks the tie is the fact that 3N-Fundamentalism and 3D-Fundamentalism
are explanatorily inequivalent, and the latter explains the Symmetrization Pos-
tulate better than the former.
Therefore, the discussion about the wave function provides another useful case for
the ongoing debate about theoretical equivalence and structure. The connection should
prove fruitful for future research.42
42Thanks to David Schroeren for discussing this last point with me.
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Chapter 3
Quantum Mechanics in a Time-Asymmetric Universe
3.1 Introduction
In the foundations of quantum mechanics, it has been argued that the wave function
(pure state) of the universe represents something objective and not something merely
epistemic. Let us call this view Wave Function Realism. There are many realist pro-
posals for how to understand the wave function. Some argue that it represents things
in the ontology, either a physical field propagating on a fundamental high-dimensional
space, or a multi-field propagating on the three-dimensional physical space. Others
argue that it is in the “nomology”—having the same status as laws of nature. Still
others argue that it might belong to a new ontological category.1
Wave Function Realism has generated much debate. In fact, it has been rejected
by many people, notably by quantum Bayesians, and various anti-realists and instru-
mentalists. As a scientific realist, I do not find their arguments convincing. In previous
papers, I have assumed and defended Wave Function Realism. Nevertheless, in this
paper I want to argue for a different perspective, for reasons related to the origin of
time-asymmetry in a quantum universe.
To be sure, realism about the universal wave function is highly natural in the context
of standard quantum mechanics and various realist quantum theories such as Bohmian
1See Albert (1996); Loewer (1996); Wallace and Timpson (2010); Ney (2012); North (2013); Maudlin
(2013); Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2013); Miller (2014); Esfeld (2014); Bhogal and Perry (2015); Callender
(2015); Esfeld and Deckert (2017); Chen (2018a, 2017, 2016); Hubert and Romano (2018). For a survey
of this literature, see Chen (2018b). Notice that this is not how Albert, Loewer, or Ney characterizes
wave function realism. For them, to be a wave function realist is to be a realist about the wave function
and a fundamental high-dimensional space—the “configuration space.” For the purpose of this paper,
let us use Wave Function Realism to designate just the commitment that the wave function represents
something objective.
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mechanics (BM), GRW spontaneous collapse theories, and Everettian quantum me-
chanics (EQM). In those theories, the universal wave function is indispensable to the
kinematics and the dynamics of the quantum system. However, as I would like to
emphasize in this paper, our world is not just quantum-mechanical. We also live in a
world with a strong arrow of time (large entropy gradient). There are thermodynamic
phenomena that we hope to explain with quantum mechanics and quantum statistical
mechanics. A central theme of this paper is to suggest that quantum statistical me-
chanics is highly relevant for assessing the fundamentality and reality of the universal
wave function.
We will take a close look at the connections between the foundations of quantum sta-
tistical mechanics and various solutions to the quantum measurement problem. When
we do, we realize that we do not need to postulate a universal wave function. We need
only certain “coarse-grained” information about the quantum macrostate, which can
be represented by a density matrix. A natural question is: can we understand the
universal quantum state as a density matrix rather than a wave function? That is, can
we take an “ontic” rather than an “epistemic” attitude towards the density matrix?
The first step of this paper is to argue that we can. I call this view Density Ma-
trix Realism, the thesis that the actual quantum state of the universe is objective (as
opposed to subjective or epistemic) and impure (mixed). This idea may be unfamiliar
to some people, as we are used to take the mixed states to represent our epistemic
uncertainties of the actual pure state (a wave function). The proposal here is that the
density matrix directly represents the actual quantum state of the universe; there is no
further fact about which is the actual wave function. In this sense, the density matrix
is “fundamental.” In fact, this idea has come up in the foundations of physics.2 In the
first step, we provide a systematic discussion of Density Matrix Realism by reformulat-
ing Bohmian mechanics, GRW theories, and Everettian quantum mechanics in terms
of a fundamental density matrix.
2See, for example, Dürr et al. (2005); Maroney (2005), Wallace (2011, 2012), and Wallace (2016).
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The second step is to point out that Density Matrix Realism allows us to com-
bine quantum ontology with time-asymmetry in a new way. In classical and quantum
statistical mechanics, thermodynamic time-asymmetry arises from a special boundary
condition called the Past Hypothesis.3 I suggest that the information in the Past Hy-
pothesis is sufficient to determine a natural density matrix. I postulate the Initial Pro-
jection Hypothesis: the quantum state of the universe at t0 is given by the (normalized)
projection onto the Past Hypothesis subspace, which is a particular low-dimensional
subspace in the total Hilbert space. The conjunction of this hypothesis with Density
Matrix Realism pins down a unique initial quantum state. Since the Initial Projection
Hypothesis is as simple as the Past Hypothesis, we can use arguments for the simplicity
of the latter (which is necessary for it to be a law of nature) to argue for the simplicity
of the former. We can thus infer that the initial quantum state is very simple.
The third step is to show that, because of the simplicity and the uniqueness of the
initial quantum state (now given by a fundamental density matrix), we have a strong
case for the Nomological Thesis: the initial quantum state of the world is on a par with
laws of nature. It is a modal thesis. It implies that the initial quantum state of our
world is nomologically necessary; it could not have been otherwise.
As we shall see, this package of views has interesting implications for the reduction of
statistical mechanical probabilities to quantum mechanics, the dynamic and kinematic
unity of the universe and the subsystems, the nature of the initial quantum state, and
Humean supervenience in a quantum world.
Here is the roadmap of the paper. First, in §2, I review the foundations of quantum
mechanics and quantum statistical mechanics. In §3, I introduce the framework of
Density Matrix Realism and provide some illustrations. In §4, I propose the Initial
Projection Hypothesis in the framework of Density Matrix Realism. In §5, I discuss
their implications for statistical mechanics, dynamic unity, and kinematic unity. In §6,
I suggest that they provide a strong case for the Nomological Thesis and a new solution
to the conflict between quantum entanglement and Humean supervenience.
3For an extended discussion, see Albert (2000).
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3.2 Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Statistical Mechanics
In this section, we first review the foundations of quantum mechanics and statistical
mechanics. As we shall see in the next section, they suggest an alternative to Wave
Function Realism.
3.2.1 Quantum Mechanics
Standard quantum mechanics is often presented with a set of axioms and rules about
measurement. Firstly, there is a quantum state of the system, represented by a wave
function ψ. For a spin-less N -particle quantum system in R3, the wave function is
a (square-integrable) function from the configuration space R3N to the complex num-






Thirdly, the Schrödinger evolution of the wave function is supplemented with collapse
rules. The wave function typically evolves into superpositions of macrostates, such as
the cat being alive and the cat being dead. This can be represented by wave func-
tions on the configuration space with disjoint macroscopic supports X and Y . During
measurements, which are not precisely defined processes in the standard formalism, the
wave function undergoes collapses. Moreover, the probability that it collapses into any
particular macrostate X is given by the Born rule:
P (X) = 󱮬
X
󳈌ψ(x)󳈌2dx (3.2)
As such, quantum mechanics is not a candidate for a fundamental physical theory.
It has two dynamical laws: the deterministic Schrödinger equation and the stochastic
collapse rule. What are the conditions for applying the former, and what are the
conditions for applying the latter? Measurements and observations are extremely vague
concepts. Take a concrete experimental apparatus for example. When should we treat
it as part of the quantum system that evolves linearly and when should we treat it as
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an “observer,” i.e. something that stands outside the quantum system and collapses
the wave function? That is, in short, the quantum measurement problem.4
Various solutions have been proposed regarding the measurement problem. Bohmian
mechanics (BM) solves it by adding particles to the ontology and an additional guidance
equation for the particles’ motion. Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theories postulate
a spontaneous collapse mechanism. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) simply re-
moves the collapse rules from standard quantum mechanics and suggest that there are
many (emergent) worlds, corresponding to the branches of the wave function, which are
all real. My aim here is not to adjudicate among these theories. Suffice it to say that
they are all quantum theories that remove the centrality of observations and observers.
To simplify the discussions, I will use BM as a key example.5 In BM, in addition to
the wave function that evolves unitarily according to the Schrödinger equation, particles









(q = Q) (3.3)
Moreover, the initial particle distribution is given by the quantum equilibrium distri-
bution:
ρt0(q) = 󳈌ψ(q, t0)󳈌2 (3.4)
By equivariance, if this condition holds at the initial time, then it holds at all times.
Consequently, BM agrees with standard quantum mechanics with respect to the Born
rule predictions (which are all there is to the observable predictions of quantum me-
chanics). For a universe with N particles, let us call the wave function of the universe
the universal wave function and denote it by Ψ(q1, q2, ...qN).
3.2.2 Quantum Statistical Mechanics
Statistical mechanics concerns macroscopic systems such as gas in a box. It is an
important subject for understanding the arrow of time. For concreteness, let us consider
4See Bell (1990) and Myrvold (2017) for introductions to the quantum measurement problem.
5See Dürr et al. (1992) for a rigorous presentation of BM and its statistical analysis.
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a quantum-mechanical system withN fermions (withN > 1020) in a box Λ = [0, L]3 ⊂ R3
and a Hamiltonian Ĥ. I will first present the “individualistic” view followed by the
“ensemblist” view of quantum statistical mechanics (QSM).6 I will include some brief
remarks comparing QSM to classical statistical mechanics (CSM), the latter of which
may be more familiar to some readers.
1. Microstate: at any time t, the microstate of the system is given by a normalized
(and anti-symmetrized) wave function:
ψ(q1, ...,qN) ∈Htotal = L2(R3N ,Ck) , ∥ ψ ∥L2= 1, (3.5)
where Htotal = L2(R3N ,Ck) is the total Hilbert space of the system. (In CSM,
the microstate is given by the positions and the momenta of all the particles,
represented by a point in phase space.)






(In CSM, the particles move according to the Hamiltonian equations.)
3. Energy shell: the physically relevant part of the total Hilbert space is the subspace
(“the energy shell”):
H ⊆Htotal , H = span{φα ∶ Eα ∈ [E,E + δE]}, (3.7)
This is the subspace (of the total Hilbert space) spanned by energy eigenstates
φα whose eigenvalues Eα belong to the [E,E + δE] range. Let D = dimH , the
number of energy levels between E and E + δE.
We only consider wave functions ψ in H .
4. Measure: the measure µ is given by the normalized surface area measure on the
unit sphere in the energy subspace S (H ).
6Here I follow the discussions in Goldstein et al. (2010a) and Goldstein and Tumulka (2011).
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5. Macrostate: with a choice of macro-variables (suitably “rounded” à la Von Neu-
mann (1955)), the energy shell H can be orthogonally decomposed into macro-
spaces:
H = ⊕νHν , 󱮦
ν
dimHν =D (3.8)
Each Hν corresponds more or less to small ranges of values of macro-variables
that we have chosen in advance. (In CSM, the phase space can be partitioned
into sets of phase points. They will be the macrostates.)
6. Non-unique correspondence: typically, a wave function is in a superposition of
macrostates and is not entirely in any one of the macrospaces. However, we can
make sense of situations where ψ is (in the Hilbert space norm) very close to a
macrostate Hν :
⟨ψ󳈌Pν 󳈌ψ⟩ ≈ 1, (3.9)
where Pν is the projection operator onto Hν . This means that almost all of 󳈌ψ⟩
lies in Hν . (In CSM, a phase point is always entirely within some macrostate.)
7. Thermal equilibrium: typically, there is a dominant macro-space Heq that has a




A system with wave function ψ is in equilibrium if the wave function ψ is very
close to Heq in the sense of (3.9): ⟨ψ󳈌Peq 󳈌ψ⟩ ≈ 1.
Simple Example. Consider a gas consisting of n = 1023 atoms in a box Λ ⊆ R3.
The system is governed by quantum mechanics. We orthogonally decompose the
Hilbert space H into 51 macro-spaces: H0 ⊕H2 ⊕H4 ⊕ ...⊕H100, where Hν is
the subspace corresponding to the macrostate such that the number of atoms in
the left half of the box is between (ν − 1)% and (ν + 1)% of n. In this example,
H50 has the overwhelming majority of dimensions and is thus the equilibrium
macro-space. A system whose wave function is very close to H50 is in equilibrium
(for this choice of macrostates).
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8. Boltzmann Entropy: the Boltzmann entropy of a quantum-mechanical system
with wave function ψ that is very close to a macrostate Hν is given by:
SB(ψ) = kBlog(dimHν), (3.11)
where Hν denotes the subspace containing almost all of ψ in the sense of (3.9).
The thermal equilibrium state thus has the maximum entropy:
SB(eq) = kBlog(dimHeq) ≈ kBlog(D), (3.12)
where Heq denotes the equilibrium macrostate. (In CSM, Boltzmann entropy
of a phase point is proportional to the logarithm of the volume measure of the
macrostate it belongs to.)
9. Low-Entropy Initial Condition: when we consider the universe as a quantum-
mechanical system, we postulate a special low-entropy boundary condition on the
universal wave function—the quantum-mechanical version of the Past Hypothesis:
Ψ(t0) ∈HPH , dimHPH ≪ dimHeq ≈ dimH (3.13)
where HPH is the Past Hypothesis macro-space with dimension much smaller
than that of the equilibrium macro-space.7 Hence, the initial state has very low
entropy in the sense of (3.11). (In CSM, the Past Hypothesis says that the initial
microstate is in a low-entropy macrostate with very small volume.)
10. A central task of QSM is to establish mathematical results that demonstrate (or
suggest) that µ−most (maybe even all) wave functions of small subsystems, such
as gas in a box, will approach thermal equilibrium.
Above is the individualistic view of QSM in a nutshell. In contrast, the ensemblist
view of QSM differs in several ways. First, on the ensemblist view, instead of focusing
on the wave function of an individual system, the focus is on an ensemble of systems
7We should assume that HPH is finite-dimensional, in which case we can use the normalized surface
area measure on the unit sphere as the typicality measure for # 10. It remains an open question in
QSM about how to formulate the low-entropy initial condition when the initial macro-space is infinite-
dimensional.
71





= [Ĥ, Ŵ ]. (3.14)
The crucial difference between the individualistic and the ensemblist views of QSM
lies in the definition of thermal equilibrium. On the ensemblist view, a system is in
thermal equilibrium if:
W = ρmc or W = ρcan, (3.15)
where ρmc is the microcanonical ensemble and ρcan is the canonical ensemble.
9
For the QSM individualist, if the microstate ψ of a system is close to some macro-
space Hν in the sense of (3.9), we can say that the macrostate of the system is Hν .





where Iν is the projection operator onto Hν . Ŵν is thus a representation of the
macrostate. It can be decomposed into wave functions, but the decomposition is not
unique. Different measures can give rise to the same density matrix. One such choice
is µ(dψ), the uniform distribution over wave functions:
Ŵν = 󱮬
S (Hν)
µ(dψ) 󳈌ψ⟩ ⟨ψ󳈌 . (3.18)
In (3.18), Ŵν is defined with a choice of measure on wave functions in Hν . However,
we should not be misled into thinking that the density matrix is derivative of wave
functions. What is intrinsic to a density matrix is its geometrical meaning in the
Hilbert space. In the case of Ŵν , as shown in the canonical description (3.17), it is just
a normalized projection operator.10
8Ensemblists would further insist that it makes no sense to talk about the thermodynamic state of
an individual system.
9The microcanonical ensemble is the projection operator onto the energy shell H normalized by its





where Z = tr exp(−βĤ), and β is the inverse temperature of the quantum system.
10Thanks to Sheldon Goldstein for helping me appreciate the intrinsic meaning of density matrices.
That was instrumental in the final formulation of the Initial Projection Hypothesis in §4.2.
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3.3 Density Matrix Realism
According to Wave Function Realism, the quantum state of the universe is objective
and pure. On this view, Ψ is both the microstate of QSM and a dynamical object of
QM.
Let us recall the arguments for Wave Function Realism. Why do we attribute ob-
jective status to the quantum state represented by a wave function? It is because the
wave function plays crucial roles in the realist quantum theories. In BM, the wave
function appears in the fundamental dynamical equations and guides particle motion.
In GRW, the wave function spontaneously collapses and gives rise to macroscopic con-
figurations of tables and chairs. In EQM, the wave function is the whole world. If the
universe is accurately described by BM, GRW, or EQM, then the wave function is an
active “agent” that makes a difference in the world. The wave function cannot repre-
sent just our ignorance. It has to be objective, so the arguments go. But what is the
nature of the quantum state that it represents? As mentioned in the beginning of this
paper, there are several interpretations: the two field interpretations, the nomological
interpretation, and the sui generis interpretation.
On the other hand, we often use W , a density matrix, to represent our ignorance of
ψ, the actual wave function of a quantum system. W can also represent a macrostate
in QSM.11
Is it possible to be a realist about the density matrix of the universe and attribute
objective status to the quantum state it represents? That depends on whether we can
write down realist quantum theories directly in terms of W . Perhaps W does not have
enough information to be the basis of a realist quantum theory. However, if we can
formulate quantum dynamics directly in terms of W instead of Ψ such that W guides
Bohmian particles, or W collapses, or W realizes the emergent multiverse, then we
will have good reasons for taking W to represent something objective in those theories.
At the very least, the reasons for that will be on a par with those for Wave Function
11In some cases, W is easier for calculation than Ψ, such as in the case of GRW collapse theories
where there are multiple sources of randomness. Thanks to Roderich Tumulka for discussions here.
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Realism in the Ψ-theories.
However, can we describe the quantum universe with W instead of Ψ? The answer is
yes. Dürr et al. (2005) has worked out the Bohmian version. In this section, I describe
how. Let us call this new framework Density Matrix Realism.12 I will use W-Bohmian
Mechanics as the main example and explain how a fundamental density matrix can be
empirically adequate for describing a quantum world. We can also construct W-Everett
theories and W-GRW theories (which have not appeared in print so far). Similar to
Wave Function Realism, Density Matrix Realism is open to several interpretations. At
the end of this section, I will provide three field interpretations of W . In §6, I discuss
and motivate a nomological interpretation.
3.3.1 W-Bohmian Mechanics
First, we illustrate the differences between Wave Function Realism and Density Matrix
Realism by thinking about two different Bohmian theories.
In standard Bohmian mechanics (BM), an N -particle universe at a time t is de-
scribed by (Q(t), Ψ(t)). The universal wave function guides particle motion and pro-
vides the probability distribution of particle configurations. Given the centrality of Ψ
in BM, we take the wave function to represent something objective (and it is open to
several realist interpretations).
It is somewhat surprising that we can formulate a Bohmian theory with only W and
Q. This was introduced as W-Bohmian Mechanics (W-BM) in Dürr et al. (2005). The
fundamental density matrix W (t) is governed by the von Neumann equation (3.14).







󰑢qiW (q, q󰐞, t)
W (q, q󰐞, t)
(q = q󰐞 = Q), (3.19)
12The possibility that the universe can be described by a fundamental density matrix (mixed state)
has been suggested by multiple authors and explored to various extents (see Footnote #2). What is new
in this paper is the combination of Density Matrix Realism with the Initial Projection Hypothesis (§4)
and the argument for the Nomological Thesis (§6) based on that. However, Density Matrix Realism is
unfamiliar enough to warrant some clarifications and developments, and the GRW versions are new.
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(Here we have set aside spin degrees of freedom. If we include spin, we can add the
partial trace operator trCk before each occurrence of “W .”) Finally, we can impose an
initial probability distribution similar to that of the quantum equilibrium distribution:
P (Q(t0) ∈ dq) =W (q, q, t0)dq. (3.20)
The system is also equivariant: if the probability distribution holds at t0, it holds at all
times.13
With the defining equations—the von Neumann equation (3.14) and the W-guidance
equation (3.19)—and the initial probability distribution (3.20), we have a theory that
directly uses a density matrixW (t) to characterize the trajectoriesQ(t) of the universe’s
N particles. If a universe is accurately described by W-BM, then W represents the
fundamental quantum state in the theory that guides particle motion; it does not do so
via some other entity Ψ. If we have good reasons to be a wave function realist in BM,
then we have equally good reasons to be a density matrix realist in W-BM.
W-BM is empirically equivalent to BM with respect to the observable quantum
phenomena, that is, pointer readings in quantum-mechanical experiments. By the usual
typicality analysis (Dürr et al. (1992)), this follows from (3.20), which is analogous to
the quantum equilibrium distribution in BM. With the respective dynamical equations,
both BM and W-BM generate an equivariant Born-rule probability distribution over
all measurement outcomes.14
13Equivariance holds because of the following continuity equation:
∂W (q, q, t)
∂t
= −div(W (q, q, t)v),
where v denotes the velocity field generated via (3.19). See Dürr et al. (1992, 2005).
14Here I am assuming that two theories are empirically equivalent if they assign the same probability
distribution to all possible outcomes of experiments. This is the criterion used in the standard Bohmian
statistical analysis (Dürr et al. (1992)). Empirical equivalence between BM and W-BM follows from
the equivariance property plus the quantum equilibrium distribution. Suppose W-BM is governed by a
universal density matrix W and suppose BM is governed by a universal wave function chosen at random
whose statistical density matrix is W . Then the initial particle distributions on both theories are the
same: W (q, q, t0). By equivariance, the particle distributions will always be the same. Hence, they
always agree on what is typical. See Dürr et al. (2005). This is a general argument. In Chen (2019),
I present the general argument followed by a subsystem analysis of W-BM, in terms of conditional
density matrices.
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3.3.2 W-Everettian and W-GRW Theories
W-BM is a quantum theory in which the density matrix is objective. In this theory,
realism about the universal density matrix is based on the central role it plays in the laws
of a W-Bohmian universe: it appears in the fundamental dynamical equations and it
guides particle motion. (In §3.3, we will provide three concrete physical interpretations
of W .) What about other quantum theories, such as Everettian and GRW theories? Is
it possible to “replace” their universal wave functions with universal density matrices?
We show that such suggestions are also possible.15 First, let us define local beables (à
la Bell (2004)). Local beables are the part of the ontology that is localized (to some
bounded region) in physical space. Neither the total energy function nor the wave
function is a local beable. Candidate local beables include particles, space-time events
(flashes), and matter density (m(x, t)).
For the Everettian theory with no local beables (S0), we can postulate that the fun-
damental quantum state is represented by a density matrix W (t) that evolves unitarily
by the von Neumann equation (3.14). Let us call this theory W-Everett theory (W-S0).
Since there are no additional variables in the theory, the density matrix represents the
entire quantum universe. The density matrix will give rise to many branches that (for
all practical purposes) do not interfere with each other. The difference is that there will
be (in some sense) more branches in the W-Everett quantum state than in the Everett
quantum state. In the W-Everett universe, the world history will be described by the
undulation of the density matrix.16
It is difficult to find tables and chairs in a universe described only by a quantum
state. One proposal is to add “local beables” to the theory in the form of a mass-
density ontology m(x, t). The wave-function version was introduced as Sm by Allori
et al. (2010). The idea is that the wave function evolves by the Schrödinger equation
15Thanks to Roderich Tumulka, Sheldon Goldstein, and Matthias Lienert for discussions here. The
W-GRW formalism was suggested first in Allori et al. (2013).
16W-S0 is a novel version of Everettian theory, one that will require more mathematical analysis to
fully justify the emergence of macroscopic branching structure. It faces the familiar preferred-basis
problem as standard Everett does. In addition, on W-S0 there will be some non-uniqueness in the
decompositions of the Hilbert space into macrospaces. I leave the analysis for future work.
76
and determines the shape of the mass density. This idea can be used to construct a
density-matrix version (W-Sm). In this theory, W (t) will evolve unitarily by the von
Neumann equation. Next, we can define the mass-density function directly in terms of
W (t):
m(x, t) = tr(M(x)W (t)), (3.21)
where x is a physical space variable, M(x) = ∑imiδ(Qi−x) is the mass-density operator,
which is defined via the position operator Qiψ(q1, q2, ...qn) = qiψ(q1, q2, ...qn). This
allows us to determine the mass-density ontology at time t via W (t).
For the density-matrix version of GRW theory with just a quantum state (W-
GRW0), we need to introduce the collapse of a density matrix. Similar to the wave
function in GRW0, between collapses, the density matrix in W-GRW0 will evolve uni-
tarily according to the von Neumann equation. It collapses randomly, where the random
time for an N -particle system is distributed with rate Nλ, where λ is of order 10−15 s−1.
At a random time when a collapse occur at “particle” k at time T−, the post-collapse





with X distributed by the following probability density:
ρ(x) = tr(WT−Λk(x)), (3.23)
where WT+ is the post-collapse density matrix, WT− is the pre-collapse density matrix,
X is the center of the actual collapse, and Λk(x) is the collapse rate operator.17








where Qk is the position operator of “particle” k, and σ is a new constant of nature of order 10
−7 m
postulated in current GRW theories. Compare W-GRW to Ψ-GRW, where collapses happen at the





with the collapse center X being chosen randomly with probability distribution ρ(x) =
󳈌󳈌Λk(x)1󳆋2ΨT− 󳈌󳈌2dx.
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For the GRW theory (W-GRWm) with both a quantum state W (t) and a mass-
density ontology m(x, t), we can combine the above steps: W (t) evolves by the von
Neumann equation that is randomly interrupted by collapses (3.22) and m(x, t) is
defined by (3.21). We can define GRW with a flash-ontology (W-GRWf) in a similar
way, by using W (t) to characterize the distribution of flashes in physical space-time.
The flashes are the space-time events at the centers (X) of the W-GRW collapses.
To sum up: in W-S0, the entire world history is described by W (t); in W-Sm,
the local beables (mass-density) is determined by W (t); in W-GRW theories, W (t)
spontaneously collapses. These roles were originally played by Ψ, and now they are
played by W. In so far as we have good reasons for Wave Function Realism based on
the roles that Ψ plays in the Ψ-theories, we have equally good reasons for Density
Matrix Realism if the universe is accurately described by W-theories.
3.3.3 Field Intepretations of W
Realism about the density matrix only implies that it is objective and not epistemic.
Realism is compatible with a wide range of concrete interpretations of what the density
matrix represents. In this section, I provide three field interpretations of the density
matrix. But they do not exhaust all available options. In §6, I motivate a nomological
interpretation of the density matrix that is also realist.
In debates about the metaphysics of the wave function, realists have offered several
interpretations of Ψ. Wave function realists, such as Albert and Loewer, have offered a
concrete physical interpretation: Ψ represents a physical field on the high-dimensional
configuration space that is taken to be the fundamental physical space.18
Can we interpret the density matrix in a similar way? Let us start with a mathe-
matical representation of the density matrix W (t). It is defined as a positive, bounded,
self-adjoint operator Ŵ ∶ H → H with trŴ = 1. For W-BM, the configuration space
R3N , and a density operator Ŵ , the relevant Hilbert space is H , which is a subspace
18In Chen (2017), I argue against this view and suggest that there are many good reasons—internal
and external to quantum mechanics—for taking the low-dimensional physical space-time to be funda-
mental.
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of the total Hilbert space, i.e. H ⊆Htotal = L2(R3N ,C). Now, the density matrix Ŵ
can also be represented as a function
W ∶ R3N ×R3N → C (3.25)
(If we include spin, the range will be the endomorphism space End(Ck) of the space of
linear maps from Ck to itself. Notice that we have already used the position represen-
tation in (3.19) and (3.20).)
This representation enables three field interpretations of the density matrix. Let
us use W-BM as an example. First, the fundamental space is represented by R6N ,
and W represents a field on that space that assigns properties (represented by complex
numbers) to each point in R6N . In the Bohmian version, W guides the motion of a
“world particle” like a river guides the motion of a ping pong ball. (However, the world
particle only moves in a R3N subspace.) Second, the fundamental space is R3N , and W
represents a multi-field on that space that assigns properties to every ordered pair of
points (q, q󰐞) in R3N . The world particle moves according to the gradient taken with
respect to the first variable of the multi-field. Third, the fundamental space is the
physical space represented by R3, and the density matrix represents a multi-field that
assigns properties to every ordered pair of N -regions, where each N -region is composed
of N points in physical space. On this view, the density matrix guides the motion of
N particles in physical space.19
These three field interpretations are available to the density matrix realists. In so
far as we have good grounds for accepting the field interpretations of wave function
realism, we have equally good grounds for accepting these interpretations for the W-
theories. These physical interpretations, I hope, can provide further reasons for wave
function realists to take seriously the idea that density matrices can represent something
physically significant. In §6, we introduce a new interpretation of W as something
nomological, and we will motivate that with the new Initial Projection Hypothesis.
That, I believe, is the most interesting realist interpretation of the universal density
matrix all things considered.
19For discussions about the multi-field interpretation, see Forrest (1988); Belot (2012), Chen (2017),
Chen (ms.) section 3, and Hubert and Romano (2018).
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3.4 The Initial Projection Hypothesis
W-quantum theories are alternatives to Ψ-quantum theories. However, all of these
theories are time-symmetric, as they obey time-reversal invariance t→ −t.
In statistical mechanics, a fundamental postulate is added to the time-symmetric
dynamics: the Past Hypothesis, which is a low-entropy boundary condition of the
universe. In this section, we will first discuss the wave-function version of the Past
Hypothesis. Then we will use it to pick out a special density matrix. I call this the
Initial Projection Hypothesis. Finally, we point out some connections between the Initial
Projection Hypothesis and Penrose’s Weyl Curvature Hypothesis.
3.4.1 The Past Hypothesis
The history of the Past Hypothesis goes back to Ludwig Boltzmann.20 To explain time
asymmetry in a universe governed by time-symmetric equations, Botlzmann’s solution
is to add a boundary condition: the universe started in a special state of very low-
entropy. Richard Feynman agrees, “For some reason, the universe at one time had a
very low entropy for its energy content, and since then the entropy has increased.”21
Such a low-entropy initial condition explains the arrow of time in thermodynamics.22
David Albert (2000) has called this condition the Past Hypothesis (PH). However,
his proposal is stronger than the usual one concerning a low-entropy initial condition.
The usual one just postulates that the universe started in some low-entropy macrostate.
It can be any of the many macrostates, so long as it has sufficiently low entropy. Albert’s
PH postulates that there is a particular low-entropy macrostate that the universe starts
in—the one that underlies the reliability of our inferences to the past. It is the task
of cosmology to discover that initial macrostate. In what follows, I refer to the strong
20For an extended discussion, see Boltzmann (2012), Albert (2000), and Callender (2011).
21Feynman et al. (2015), 46-8.
22See Lebowitz (2008); Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest (2002) and Penrose (1979) for more discussions about
a low-entropy initial condition. See Earman (2006) for worries about the Past Hypothesis as an initial
condition for the universe. See Goldstein et al. (2016) for a discussion about the possibility, and some
recent examples, of explaining the arrow of time without the Past Hypothesis.
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version of PH unless indicated otherwise.23
In QSM, PH takes the form of §2.2 #9. That is, the microstate (a wave function)
starts in a particular low-dimensional subspace in Hilbert space (the PH-subspace).
However, it does not pin down a unique microstate. There is still a continuous infinity
of possible microstates compatible with the PH-subspace.
It is plausible to think that, for PH to work as a successful explanation for the Second
Law, it has to be on a par with other fundamental laws of nature. That is, we should
take PH to be a law of nature and not just a contingent initial condition, for otherwise
it might be highly unlikely that our past was in lower entropy and that our inferences to
the past are reliable. Already in the context of a weaker version of PH, Feynman (2017)
suggests that the low-entropy initial condition should be understood as a law of nature.
However, PH by itself is not enough. Since there are anti-thermodynamic exceptions
even for trajectories starting from the PH-subspace, it is crucial to impose another law
about a uniform probability distribution on the subspace. This is the quantum analog
of what Albert (2000) calls the Statistical Postulate (SP). It corresponds to the measure
µ we specified in §2.2 #4. We used it to state the typicality statement in #10. Barry
Loewer calls the joint system—the package of laws that includes PH and SP in addition
to the dynamical laws of physics—the Mentaculus Vision.24
3.4.2 Introducing the Initial Projection Hypothesis
The Past Hypothesis uses a low-entropy macrostate (PH-subspace) to constrain the
microstate of the system (a state vector in QSM). This is natural from the perspective
of Wave Function Realism, according to which the state vector (the wave function)
23In Chen (2018d), a companion paper, I discuss different versions of the Past Hypothesis—the strong,
the weak, and the fuzzy—as well as their implications for the uniqueness of the initial quantum state
that we will come to soon. The upshot is that in all cases it will be sufficiently unique for eliminating
statistical mechanical probabilities.
24For developments and defenses of the nomological account of the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical
Postulate, see Albert (2000); Loewer (2007); Wallace (2011, 2012) and Loewer (2016). Albert and
Loewer are writing mainly in the context of CSM. The Mentaculus Vision is supposed to provide a
“probability map of the world.” As such, it requires one to take the probability distribution very
seriously.
To be sure, the view that PH is nomological has been challenged. See discussions in Price (1997);
Sklar (1995), and Callender (2004). However, those challenges are no more threatening to IPH being a
law than PH being a law. We will come back to this point after introducing IPH.
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represents the physical degrees of freedom of the system. The initial state of the system
is described by a normalized wave function Ψ(t0). Ψ(t0) has to lie in the special low-
dimensional Hilbert space HPH with dimHPH ≪ dimHeq. Moreover, there are many
different choices of initial wave functions in HPH . That is, PH is compatible with
many different low-entropy wave functions. Furthermore, for stating the typicality
statements, we also need to specify a measure µ on the unit sphere of HPH . For
the finite-dimensional case, it is just the normalized surface area measure on the unit
sphere.
Density Matrix Realism suggests an alternative way to think about the low-entropy
boundary condition. PH pins down the initial macrostate HPH , a special subspace
of the total Hilbert space. Although HPH is compatible with many density matrices,
there is a natural choice—the normalized projection operator onto HPH . Just as in





where t0 represents a temporal boundary of the universe, IPH is the projection operator
onto HPH , dim counts the dimension of the Hilbert space, and dimHPH ≪ dimHeq.
Since the quantum state at t0 has the lowest entropy, we call t0 the initial time. We
shall call (3.26) the Initial Projection Hypothesis (IPH). In words: the initial density
matrix of the universe is the normalized projection onto the PH-subspace.
I propose that we add IPH to any W-quantum theory. The resultant theories will
be called WIPH -theories. For example, here are the equations of WIPH -BM:
(A) ŴIPH(t0) = IPHdimHPH ,
(B) P (Q(t0) ∈ dq) =WIPH(q, q, t0)dq,







WIPH(q,q󰐞,t) (q = q
󰐞 = Q).
(A) is IPH and (B)—(D) are the defining equations of W-BM. (Given the initial quan-
tum state ŴIPH(t0), there is a live possibility that for every particle at t0, its velocity
82
is zero. However, even in this possibility, as long as the initial quantum state “spreads
out” later, as we assume it would, the particle configuration will typically start moving
at a later time. This is true because of equivariance.25)
Contrast these equations with BM formulated with wave functions and PH (not
including SP for now), which will be called ΨPH -BM:
(A’) Ψ(t0) ∈HPH ,
(B’) P (Q(t0) ∈ dq) = 󳈌Ψ(q, t0)󳈌2dq,







IPH (A) in WIPH -BM plays the same role as PH (A’) in ΨPH -BM. Should IPH be
interpreted as a law of nature in WIPH -theories? I think it should be, for the same
reason that PH should be interpreted as a law of nature in the corresponding theories.
The reason that PH should be interpreted as a law26 is because it is a particularly
simple and informative statement that accounts for the widespread thermodynamic
asymmetry in time. PH is simple because it characterizes a simple macrostate HPH ,
of which the initial wave function is a vector. PH is informative because with PH the
dynamical equations predict time asymmetry and without PH the dynamical equations
cannot. Similarly, IPH is simple because it provides crucial resources for explaining
the arrow of time. IPH is informative because it is essential for explaining the time
asymmetry in a quantum universe described by a density matrix. (This is in addition
to the fact that IPH helps determine the WIPH -version of the guidance equation (D).)
To be sure, PH and IPH as laws face the same worries: both are statements about
boundary conditions but we usually think of laws as dynamical equations. However,
these worries are no more threatening to IPH being a law than PH being a law.
Let us make three remarks about IPH. Firstly, IPH defines a unique initial quantum
state. The quantum state ŴIPH(t0) is informationally equivalent to the constraint that
25Thanks to Sheldon Goldstein and Tim Maudlin for discussions here.
26See, for example, Feynman (2017); Albert (2000); Loewer (2007) and Loewer (2016).
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PH imposes on the initial microstates. Assuming that PH selects a unique low-entropy
macrostate, ŴIPH(t0) is singled out by the data in PH.27
Secondly, on the universal scale, we do not need to impose an additional probability
or typicality measure on the Hilbert space. ŴIPH(t0) is mathematically equivalent to an
integral over projection onto each normalized state vectors (wave functions) compatible
with PH with respect to a normalized surface area measure µ. But here we are not
defining ŴIPH(t0) in terms of state vectors. Rather, we are thinking of ŴIPH(t0) as a
geometric object in the Hilbert space: the (normalized) projection operator onto HPH .
That is the intrinsic understanding of the density matrix.28
Thirdly, ŴIPH(t0) is simple. Related to the first remark, IPH defines ŴIPH(t0)
explicitly as the normalized projection operator onto HPH . There is a natural corre-
spondence between a subspace and its projection operator. If we specify the subspace,
we know what its projection operator is, and vice versa. Since the projection operator
onto a subspace carries no more information than that subspace itself, the projection
operator is no more complex than HPH . This is different from ΨPH , which is con-
fined by PH to be a vector inside HPH . A vector carries more information than the
subspace it belongs to, as specifying a subspace is not sufficient to determine a vector.
For example, to determine a vector in an 18-dimensional subspace of a 36-dimensional
vector space, we need 18 coordinates in addition to specifying the subspace. The higher
the dimension of the subspace, the more information is needed to specify the vector.
27The weaker versions of PH are vague about the exact initial low-entropy macrostate. It is vague
because, even with a choice of macro-variables, there may be many subspaces that can play the role of
a low-entropy initial condition. It would be arbitrary, from the viewpoint of wave-function theories, to
pick a specific subspace. In contrast, it would not be arbitrary from the viewpoint of WIPH -theories,
as the specific subspace defines WIPH , which determines the dynamics.
28After writing the paper, I discovered that David Wallace has come to a similar idea in a forthcoming
paper. There are some subtle differences. He proposes that we can reinterpret probability distributions
in QSM as actual mixed states. Consequently, the problem of statistical mechanical probability is
“radically transformed” (if not eliminated) in QSM. Wallace’s proposal is compatible with different
probability distributions and hence different mixed states of the system. It does not require one to
choose a particular quantum state such as (3.26). In contrast, I propose a particular, natural initial
quantum state of the universe based on the PH subspace—the normalized projection onto the PH
subspace (3.26). As we discuss in §5.1, this also leads to the elimination of statistical mechanical
probability, since the initial state is fixed in the theory. Moreover, as we discuss below, the natural
state inherits the simplicity of the PH subspace, which has implications for the nature of the quantum
state. For a more detailed comparison, see Chen (2018d).
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If PH had fixed ΨPH (the QSM microstate), it would have required much more infor-
mation and become a much more complex posit. PH as it is determines ΨPH only up
to an equivalence class (the QSM macrostate). As we shall see in §6, the simplicity of
ŴIPH(t0) will be a crucial ingredient for a new version of the nomological interpretation
of the quantum state.
3.4.3 Connections to the Weyl Curvature Hypothesis
Let us point out some connections between our Initial Projection Hypothesis (IPH)
and the Weyl Curvature Hypothesis (WCH) proposed by Penrose (1979). Thinking
about the origin of the Second Law of Thermodynamics in the early universe with
high homogeneity and isotropy, and the relationship between space-time geometry and
entropy, Penrose proposes a low-entropy hypothesis:
I propose, then, that there should be complete lack of chaos in the initial
geometry. We need, in any case, some kind of low-entropy constraint on the
initial state. But thermal equilibrium apparently held (at least very closely
so) for the matter (including radiation) in the early stages. So the ‘lowness’
of the initial entropy was not a result of some special matter distribution,
but, instead, of some very special initial spacetime geometry. The indica-
tions of [previous sections], in particular, are that this restriction on the
early geometry should be something like: the Weyl curvature Cabcd vanishes
at any initial singularity. (Penrose (1979), p.630, emphasis original)
The Weyl curvature tensor Cabcd is the traceless part of the Riemann curvature tensor
Rabcd. It is not fixed completely by the stress-energy tensor and thus has independent
degrees of freedom in Einstein’s general theory of relativity. Since the entropy of the
matter distribution is quite high, the origin of thermodynamic asymmetry should be
due to the low entropy in geometry, which corresponds very roughly to the vanishing
of the Weyl curvature tensor.
WCH is an elegant and simple way of encoding the initial low-entropy boundary
condition in the classical spacetime geometry. If WCH could be extended to a quantum
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theory of gravity, presumably it would pick out a simple subspace (or subspaces) of
the total Hilbert space that corresponds to Cabcd → 0. Applying IPH to such a the-
ory, the initial density matrix will be the normalized projection onto that subspace
(subspaces).29
3.5 Theoretical Payoffs
WPH -quantum theories, the result of applying IPH to W-theories, have two theoretical
payoffs, which we explore in this section. These are by no means decisive arguments
in favor of the density-matrix framework, but they display some interesting differences
with the wave-function framework.
3.5.1 Harmony between Statistical Mechanics and Quantum Mechan-
ics
In WPH -quantum theories, statistical mechanics is made more harmonious with quan-
tum mechanics. As we pointed out earlier, standard QM and QSM contain the wave
function in addition to the density matrix, and they require the addition of both the
Past Hypothesis (PH) and the Statistical Postulate (SP) to the dynamical laws. In
particular, we have two kinds of probabilities: the quantum-mechanical ones (Born rule
probabilities) and the statistical mechanical ones (SP). The situation is quite differ-
ent in our framework. This is true for all the WPH -theories. We will use WPH -BM
((A)—(D)) as an example.
WPH -BM completely specifies the initial quantum state, unlike ΨPH -BM. For ΨPH -
BM, because of time-reversal invariance, some initial wave functions compatible with
PH will evolve to lower entropy. These are called anti-entropic exceptions. However,
the uniform probability distribution (SP) assigns low probability to these exceptions.
Hence, we expect that with overwhelming probability the actual wave function is en-
tropic. For WPH -BM, in contrast, there is no need for something like SP, as there
29There is another connection between the current project and Penrose’s work. The W-Everettian
theory that we considered in §3.2 combined with the Initial Projection Hypothesis is a theory that
satisfies strong determinism (Penrose (1989)). This is because the entire history of the WPH -Everettian
universe described by WIPH(t), including its initial condition, is fixed by the laws.
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is only one initial density matrix compatible with IPH—WIPH(t0). It is guaranteed
to evolve to future states that have entropic behaviors. Therefore, on the univer-
sal scale, WPH -BM eliminates the need for SP and thus the need for a probabil-
ity/typicality measure that is in addition to the quantum-mechanical measure (B).
This is a nice feature of WPH -theories, as it is desirable to unify the two sources of ran-
domness: quantum-mechanical and statistical-mechanical. Of course, wave functions
and statistical-mechanical probabilities are still useful to analyze subsystems such as
gas in a box, but they no longer play fundamental roles in WPH -theories. Another
strategy to eliminate SP has been explored in the context of GRW jumps by Albert
(2000). Wallace (2011, 2012) has proposed a replacement of SP with a non-probabilistic
constraint on the microstate, giving rise to the Simple Dynamical Conjecture. These
are quite different proposals, all of which deserve further developments.
3.5.2 Descriptions of the Universe and the Subsystems
WPH -quantum theories also bring more unity to the kinematics and the dynamics of
the universe and the subsystems.
Let us start with a quantum-mechanical universe U . Suppose it contains many
subsystems. Some of them will be interacting heavily with the environment, while
others will be effectively isolated from the environment. For a universe that contain
some quasi-isolated subsystems (interactions with the environment effectively vanish),
the following is a desirable property:
Dynamic Unity The dynamical laws of the universe are the same as the effective
laws of most quasi-isolated subsystems.
Dynamic Unity is a property that can come in degrees, rather than an “on-or-off” prop-
erty. Theory A has more dynamic unity than Theory B, if the fundamental equations
in A are valid in more subsystems than those in B. This property is desirable, but not
indispensable. It is desirable because law systems that apply both at the universal level
and at the subsystem level are unifying and explanatory.
W-BM has more dynamic unity than BM formulated with a universal wave function.
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For quantum systems without spin, we can always follow Dürr et al. (1992) to define
conditional wave functions in BM. For example, if the universe is partitioned into a
system S1 and its environment S2, then for S1, we can define its conditional wave
function:
ψcond(q1) = CΨ(q1,Q2), (3.27)
where C is a normalization factor and Q2 is the actual configuration of S2. ψcond(q1)
always gives the velocity field for the particles in S1 according to the guidance equation.
However, for quantum systems with spin, this is not always true. Since BM is described
by (Ψ(t),Q(t)), it does not contain actual values of spin. Since there are no actual spins
to plug into the spin indices of the wave function, we cannot always define conditional
wave functions in an analogous way. Nevertheless, in those circumstances, we can
follow Dürr et al. (2005) to define a conditional density matrix for S1, by plugging
in the actual configuration of S2 and tracing over the spin components in the wave
function associated with S2.
30 The conditional density matrix will guide the particles
in S1 by the W-guidance equation (the spin version with the partial trace operator).
In W-BM, the W-guidance equation is always valid for the universe and the sub-
systems. In BM, sometimes subsystems do not have conditional wave functions, and
thus the wave-function version of the guidance equation is not always valid. In this
sense, the W-BM equations are valid in more circumstances than the BM equations.
However, this point does not rely on IPH.
What about Everettian and GRW theories? Since GRW and Everettian theories
do not have fundamental particles, we cannot obtain conditional wave functions for
subsystems as in BM. However, even in the Ψ-versions of GRW and Everett, many
subsystems will not have pure-state descriptions by wave functions due to the prevalence






















of entanglement. Most subsystems can be described only by a mixed-state density
matrix, even when the universe as a whole is described by a wave function. In contrast,
in WPH -Everett theories and WPH -GRW theories, there is more uniformity across
the subsystem level and the universal level: the universe as a whole as well as most
subsystems are described by the same kind of object—a (mixed-state) density matrix.
Since state descriptions concern the kinematics of a theory, we say that W-Everett and
W-GRW theories have more kinematic unity than their Ψ-counterparts:
Kinematic Unity The state description of the universe is of the same kind as the
state descriptions of most quasi-isolated subsystems.
So far, my main goal has been to show that Density Matrix Realism + IPH is a
viable position. They have theoretical payoffs that are interestingly different from those
in the original package (Wave Function Realism + PH). In the next section, we look at
their relevance to the nature of the quantum state.
3.6 The Nomological Thesis
Combining Density Matrix Realism with IPH gives us WPH -quantum theories that
have interesting theoretical payoffs. We have also argued that the initial quantum state
in such theories would be simple and unique. In this section, we show that the latter
fact lends support to the nomological interpretation of the quantum state:
The Nomological Thesis: The initial quantum state of the world is nomological.
However, “nomological” has several senses and has been used in several ways in the
literature. We will start with some clarifications.
3.6.1 The Classical Case
We can clarify the sense of the“nomological” by taking another look at classical me-
chanics. In classical N -particle Hamiltonian mechanics, it is widely accepted that the
Hamiltonian function is nomological, and that the ontology consists in particles with
positions and momenta. Their state is given by X = (q1(t), ...,qN(t);p1(t), ...,pn(t)),
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Their motion corresponds to a trajectory in phase space. The velocity field on phase
space is obtained by taking suitable derivatives of the Hamiltonian function H. The
equations have the form:
dX
dt
= F (X) = FH(X) (3.31)
Here, FH(X) is H(q, p) with suitable derivative operators. The Hamiltonian equations




















That is, the RHS of the Hamiltonian equations, after making the Hamiltonian function
explicit, are still simple. H is just a convenient shorthand for (3.32) and (3.33). More-
over, H is also fixed by the theory. A classical universe is governed by the dynamical
laws plus the fundamental interactions. If H were different in (3.31), then we would
have a different physical theory (though it would still belong to the class of theories
called classical mechanics). For example, we can add another term in (3.33) to encode
another fundamental interaction, which will result in a different theory.
Consequently, it is standard to interpret H as a function in (3.30) that does not
represent things or properties of the ontology. Expressed in terms of H, the equations
of motion take a particularly simple form. The sense that H is nomological is that
(i) it generates motion, (ii) it is simple, (iii) it is fixed by the theory (nomologically
necessary), and (iv) it does not represent things in the ontology. In contrast, the
position and momentum variables in (3.30) are “ontological” in that they represent
things and properties of the ontology, take on complicated values, change according to
H, and are not completely fixed by the theory (contingent).
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3.6.2 The Quantum Case
It is according to the above sense that Dürr et al. (1996); Goldstein and Teufel (2001),
and Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2013) propose that the universal wave function in BM is
nomological (and governs things in the ontology). With the guidance equation, Ψ
generates the motion of particles. It is of the same form as above:
dX
dt
= F (X) = FΨ(X). (3.34)
Why is it simple? Generic wave functions are not simple. However, they observe that, in
some formulations of quantum gravity, the universal wave function satisfies the Wheeler-
DeWitt equation and is therefore stationary. To be stationary, the wave function does
not have time-dependence and probably has many symmetries, in which case it could
be quite simple. The Bohmian theory then will explicitly stipulate what the universal
wave function is. Therefore, in these theories, provided that Ψ is sufficiently simple, we
can afford the same interpretation of Ψ as we can for H in classical mechanics: both
are nomological in the above sense.
WIPH -BM also supports the nomological interpretation of the quantum state but
via a different route. With the W-guidance equation, WIPH generates the motion of
particles. It is of the same form as above:
dX
dt
= F (X) = FWIPH(X). (3.35)
Why is it simple? Here we do not need to appeal to specific versions of quantum gravity,
which are still to be worked out and may not guarantee the simplicity of Ψ. Instead, we
can just appeal to IPH. We have argued in §4.2 that IPH is simple and that WIPH(t0)
is simple. Since the quantum state evolves unitarily by the von Neumann equation, we
can obtain the quantum state at any later time as:
ŴIPH(t) = e−iĤt󳆋h̵ŴIPH(t0)eiĤt󳆋h̵ (3.36)
SinceWIPH(t) is a simple function of the time-evolution operator and the initial density
matrix, and since both are simple, WIPH(t) is also simple. So we can think of WIPH(t)
just as a convenient shorthand for (3.36). (This is not true for 󳈌Ψ(t)⟩ = Ĥ 󳈌Ψ(t0)⟩, as
generic 󳈌Ψ(t0)⟩ is not simple at all.)
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The “shorthand” way of thinking about WIPH(t) implies that the equation of par-
ticle motion has a time-dependent form FWIPH(X, t). Does time-dependence undercut
the nomological interpretation? It does not in this case, as the FWIPH(X, t) is still
simple even with time-dependence. It is true that time-independence is often a hall-
mark of a nomological object, but it is not always the case. In this case, we have
simplicity without time-independence. Moreover, unlike the proposal of Dürr et al.
(1996); Goldstein and Teufel (2001), and Goldstein and Zangh̀ı (2013), we do not need
time-independence to argue for the simplicity of the quantum state.
Since WIPH(t0) is fixed by IPH, FWIPH is also fixed by the theory. Let us expand











󰑢qi ⟨q󳈌 e−iĤt󳆋h̵ŴIPH(t0)eiĤt󳆋h̵ 󳈌q󰐞⟩
⟨q󳈌 e−iĤt󳆋h̵ŴIPH(t0)eiĤt󳆋h̵ 󳈌q󰐞⟩
(q = q󰐞 = Q)
(3.37)
The initial quantum state (multiplied by the time-evolution operators) generates mo-
tion, has a simple form, and is fixed by the boundary condition (IPH) in WIPH -BM.
Therefore, it is nomological. This is of course a modal thesis. The initial quantum
state, which is completely specified by IPH, could not have been different.
Let us consider other WIPH -theories with local beables. In WIPH -Sm, the initial
quantum state has the same simple form and is fixed by IPH. It does not generate a
velocity field, since there are no fundamental particles in the theory. Instead, it deter-
mines the configuration of the mass-density field on physical space. This is arguably
different from the sense of nomological that H in classical mechanics displays. Never-
theless, the mass-density field and the Bohmian particles play a similar role—they are
“local beables” that make up tables and chairs, and they are governed by the quan-
tum state. In WIPH -GRWm and WIPH -GRWf, the initial quantum state has the same
simple form and is fixed by IPH. It does not generate a velocity field, and it evolves
stochastically. This will determine a probability distribution over configurations of lo-
cal beables—mass densities or flashes—on physical space. The initial quantum state
in these theories can be given an extended nomological interpretation, in the sense that
condition (i) is extended such that it covers other kinds of ontologies and dynamics: (i’)
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the quantum state determines (deterministically or stochastically) the configuration of
local beables.
The WIPH -theories with local beables support the nomological interpretation of the
initial quantum state. It can be interpreted in non-Humean ways and Humean ways.
On the non-Humean proposal, we can think of the initial quantum state as an additional
nomological entity that explains the distribution of particles, fields, or flashes. On the
Humean proposal, in contrast, we can think of the initial quantum state as something
that summarizes a separable mosaic. This leads to reconciliation between Humean
supervenience and quantum entanglement.
3.6.3 Humean Supervenience
Recall that according to Humean supervenience (HS), the ”vast mosaic of local matters
of particular fact” is a supervenience base for everything else in the world, the meta-
physical ground floor on which everything else depends. On this view, laws of physics
are nothing over and above the “mosaic.” They are just the axioms in the simplest and
most informative summaries of the local matters of particular fact. A consequence of
HS is that the complete physical state of the universe is determined by the properties
and spatiotemporal arrangement of the local matters (suitably extended to account for
vector-valued magnititudes) of particular facts. It follows that there should not be any
state of the universe that fails to be determined by the properties of individual space-
time points.31 Quantum entanglement, if it were in the fundamental ontology, would
present an obstacle to HS, because entanglement is not determined by the properties
of space-time points. The consideration above suggests a strong prima facie conflict
between HS and quantum physics. On the basis of quantum non-separability, Tim
Maudlin has proposed an influential argument against HS.32
WIPH -theories with local beables offer a way out of the conflict between quantum
entanglement and Humean supervenience. A Humean can interpret the laws (including
the IPH) as the axioms in the best system that summarize a separable mosaic. Take
31This is one reading of David Lewis. Tim Maudlin (2007a) calls this thesis “Separability.”
32See Maudlin (2007a), Chapter 2.
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WIPH -BM as an example:
The WIPH-BM mosaic: particle trajectories Q(t) on physical space-time.
The WIPH-BM best system: four equations—the simplest and strongest axioms
summarizing the mosaic:
(A) ŴIPH(t0) = IPHdimHPH
(B) P (Q(t0) ∈ dq) =WIPH(q, q, t0)dq,







WIPH(q,q󰐞,t) (q = q
󰐞 = Q).
Notice that (A)—(D) are simple and informative statements about Q(t). They are ex-
pressed in terms of ŴIPH(t), which via law (C) can be expressed in terms of ŴIPH(t0).
We have argued previously that the initial quantum state can be given a nomological
interpretation. The Humean maneuver is that the law statements are to be under-
stood as axioms of the best summaries of the mosaic. The mosaic described above is
completely separable, while the best system, completely specifying the quantum state
and the dynamical laws, contains all the information about quantum entanglement
and superpositions. The entanglement facts are no longer fundamental. As on the
original version of Humean supervenience, the best system consisting of (A)—(D) su-
pervenes on the mosaic. Hence, this proposal reconciles Humean supervenience with
quantum entanglement. As it turns out, the above version of Quantum Humeanism
also achieves more theoretical harmony, dynamical unity, and kinematic unity (§5),
which are desirable from the Humean best-system viewpoint. We can perform similar
“Humeanization” maneuvers on the density matrix in other quantum theories with lo-
cal beables—W-GRWm, W-GRWf, and W-Sm (although such procedures might not be
as compelling).
This version of Quantum Humeanism based on WIPH -theories is different from the
other approaches in the literature: Albert (1996); Loewer (1996); Miller (2014); Esfeld
(2014); Bhogal and Perry (2015); Callender (2015) and Esfeld and Deckert (2017). In
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contrast to the high-dimensional proposal of Albert (1996) and Loewer (1996), our
version preserves the fundamentality of physical space.
The difference between our version and those of Miller (2014); Esfeld (2014); Bhogal
and Perry (2015); Callender (2015), and Esfeld and Deckert (2017) is more subtle. They
are concerned primarily with Ψ-BM. We can summarize their views as follows (although
they do not agree on all the details). There are several parts to their proposals. First,
the wave function is merely part of the best system. It is more like parameters in the
laws such as mass and charge. Second, just like the rest of the best system, the wave
function supervenes on the mosaic of particle trajectories. Third, the wave function
does not have to be very simple. The Humean theorizer, on this view, just needs to
find the simplest and strongest summary of the particle histories, but the resultant
system can be complex simpliciter. One interpretation of this view is that the best
system for ΨPH -BM is just (A’)—(D’) in §4.2 (although they do not explicitly consider
(A’)), such that neither the mosaic nor the best system specifies the exact values of the
universal wave function. In contrast, our best system completely specifies the universal
quantum state. The key difference between our approaches is that their interpretation of
the wave function places much weaker constraints than our nomological interpretation
does. It is much easier for something to count as being part of the best system on
their approach than on ours. While they do not require the quantum state to be
simple, we do. For them, the Bohmian guidance equation is likely very complex after
plugging in the actual wave function ΨPH on the RHS, but ΨPH can still be part of
their best system.33 For us, it is crucial that the equation remains simple after plugging
in WIPH(t0) for it to be in the best system. Consequently, WIPH(t0) is nomological
in the sense spelled out in §6.1, and we can give it a Humean interpretation similar to
that of the Hamiltonian function in CM. Generic ΨPH , on the other hand, cannot be
nomological in our sense. But that is ok for them, as their best-system interpretation
does not require the strong nomological condition that we use. Here we do not attempt
to provide a detailed comparison; we do that in Chen (2018c).
33See Dewar (2017) §5 for some worries about the weaker criterion on the best system.
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3.7 Conclusion
I have introduced a new package of views: Density Matrix Realism, the Initial Projec-
tion Hypothesis, and the Nomological Thesis. In the first two steps, we introduced a
new class of quantum theories—WPH -theories. In the final step, we argue that it is a
theory in which the initial quantum state can be given a nomological interpretation.
Each is interesting in its own right, and they do not need to be taken together. However,
they fit together quite well. They provide alternatives to standard versions of realism
about quantum mechanics, a new way to get rid of statistical-mechanical probabilities,
and a new solution to the conflict between quantum entanglement and Humean Super-
venience. To be sure, there are many other features of WPH -theories in general and
the nomological interpretation in particular that are worth exploring further.
The most interesting feature of the new package, I think, is that it brings together
the foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum statistical mechanics. In WPH -
theories, the arrow of time becomes intimately connected to the quantum-mechanical
phenomena in nature. It is satisfying to see that nature is so unified.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Theorems 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 of Chapter 1
Step 1. We begin by enriching < N-Regions, Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness, Phase–
Congruence> with some additional structures.
First, to simplify the notations, let us think of N-Regions as a set of regions, and
let us now only consider Ω ∶= N-Regions / =P , the set of “equal phase” equivalence
classes by quotienting out =P . (a =P b if they form phase intervals the same way:
∀c ∈ S, ac ∼P bc.)
Second, we fix an arbitrary A0 ∈ Ω to be the “zero phase equivalence class.”
Third, we define a non-inclusive relation C on Ω according to CP on N-Regions.
(∀A,B,C ∈ Ω, C(A,B,C) iff A,B,C are pairwise distinct and ∀a ∈ A,∀b ∈ B,∀c ∈ C,
C(a, b, c).)
Fourth, we define an addition function ○ ∶ Ω ×Ω → Ω. ∀A,B ∈ Ω, C = A ○B is the
unique element in Ω such that CB ∼ AA0, which is guaranteed to exist by (K4) and
provably unique as elements in Ω form a partition over N-Regions.
Step 2. We show that the enriched structure < Ω, ○, C > with identity element A0
satisfies the axioms for a periodic extensive structure defined in Luce (1971).
Axiom 0. < Ω, ○ > is an Abelian semigroup.
First, we show that ○ is closed: ∀A,B ∈ Ω, A ○B ∈ Ω.
This follows from (K4).
Second, we show that ○ is associative: ∀A,B,C ∈ Ω, A ○ (B ○C) = (A ○B) ○C.
This follows from (K6).
Third, we show that ○ is commutative: ∀A,B ∈ Ω, A ○B = B ○A.
This follows from (K2).
∀A,B,C,D ∈ Ω:
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Axiom 1. Exactly one of C(A,B,C) or C(A,C,B) holds.
This follows from C1.
Axiom 2. C(A,B,C) implies C(B,C,A).
This follows from C2.
Axiom 3. C(A,B,C) and C(A,C,D) implies C(A,B,D).
This follows from C2.
Axiom 4. C(A,B,C) implies C(A ○D,B ○D,C ○D) and C(D ○A,D ○B,D ○C).
This follows from (K7).
Axiom 5. If C(A0,A,B), then there exists a positive integer n such that C(A0,A,nA)
and C(A0, nB,B).
This follows from (K8).
Therefore, the enriched structure < Ω, ○, C > with identity element A0 satisfies the
axioms for a periodic extensive structure defined in Luce (1971).
Step 3. We use the homomorphisms in Luce (1971) to find the homomorphisms
for ¡ N-Regions, Phase–Clockwise–Betweenness, Phase–Congruence¿.
Since < Ω, ○, C > satisfy the axioms for a periodic structure, Corollary in Luce
(1971) says that for any real K > 0, there is a unique function φ from Ω into [0,K) s.t.
∀A,B,C ∈ Ω:
1. C(C,B,A) ⇔ φ(A) > φ(B) > φ(C) or φ(C) > φ(A) > φ(B) or φ(B) > φ(C) >
φ(A);
2. φ(A ○B) = φ(A) + φ(B) (mod K);
3. φ(A0) = 0.
Now, we define f ∶ N-Regions → [0,K) as follows: f(a) = φ(A), where a ∈ A. So we
have CP (c, b, a)⇔ f(a) ≥ f(b) ≥ f(c) or f(c) ≥ f(a) ≥ f(b) or f(b) ≥ f(c) ≥ f(a).
We can also define ψ ∶ N-Regions × N-Regions → [0,K) as follows: ψ(a, b) = φ(A)−
φ(B) (mod K), where a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Hence, ∀a, b ∈ N-Regions, ψ(a, b) = f(a) − f(b)
(mod K).
Moreover, given (K5), ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C,d ∈D, ab ∼P cd
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⇔ AB ∼ CD
⇔ A ○D = B ○C
⇔ φ(A ○D) = φ(B ○C)
⇔ φ(A) + φ(D) = φ(B) + φ(C) (mod K)
⇔ ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C,d ∈D, f(a) + f(d) = f(b) + f(c) (mod K)
⇔ ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C,d ∈D, f(a) − f(b) = f(c) − f(d) (mod K)
Therefore, we have demonstrated the existence of homomorphisms.
Step 4. We prove the uniqueness theorem.
If another function f 󰐞 ∶ N-Regions → [0,K) with the same properties exists, then
it satisfies the same homomorphism conditions. Suppose (for reductio) f 󰐞 and f differ
by more than a constant mod K.
Let D(a, b) by the function that measures the differences between f and f 󰐞 on
N-regions:
D(a, b) = [f(a) − f(b)] − [f 󰐞(a) − f 󰐞(b)] mod K.
Without loss of generality, let us suppose that there exist two regions x, y where
D(x, y) ≠ 0. By (K8), there will be a sequence of pairs of regions that are phase-
congruent to x, y: xy ∼P ya1 ∼P a1a2 ∼P ... ∼P anx. Since by assumption both f and f 󰐞
preserve the structure of phase-congruence, we have (mod K):
f(x) − f(y) = f(y) − f(a1) = ... = f(an) − f(x),
f 󰐞(x) − f 󰐞(y) = f 󰐞(y) − f 󰐞(a1) = ... = f 󰐞(an) − f 󰐞(x).
Consequently:
D(x, y) = [f(x) − f(y)] − [f 󰐞(x) − f 󰐞(y)] =D(y, a1) = ... =D(an, x)
Hence, since the above D’s are not zero, they must be either all positive or all negative.
If they are all positive, then the sum of them will be positive:
D(x, y) +D(y, a1) + ... +D(an, x) > 0
However, expanding them in terms of f and f 󰐞 we have a telescoping sum:
[f(x) − f(y)] − [f 󰐞(x) − f 󰐞(y)] + [f(y) − f(a1)] − [f 󰐞(y) − f 󰐞(a1)]
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+... + [f(an) − f(x)] − [f 󰐞(an) − f 󰐞(x)] = 0.
Contradiction. The same argument works for the case when all the D’s are negative.
Therefore, D(x, y) = 0 for all N-regions. Let a0 be where f assigns zero. Then
f 󰐞(a) − f 󰐞(a0) mod K = f(a) − f(a0) mod K = f(a),
which entails that
f 󰐞(a) = f(a) + β mod K,
with the constant β = f 󰐞(a0). QED.
100
Appendix B
A Topological Explanation of the Symmetrization
Postulate in Chapter 2
Here, we provide the technical details of our argument in §2.3.2 by following the math-
ematical derivations in Dürr et al. (2006) and Dürr et al. (2007) regarding the case of
scalar-valued wave functions. We omit the case of vector-valued wave functions as it is
mathematically more complicated but conceptually similar to the scalar case.
Our goal is to arrive at all possible Bohmian dynamics for N identical particles
moving in R3, guided by a scalar wave function. We want to show that, given some
natural assumptions, there are only two possible dynamics, corresponding to the sym-
metric wave functions for bosons and the anti-symmetric wave functions for fermions.
We will use the covering-space construction and examine the permissible topological
factors.1
The natural configuration space for N identical particles in R3 is:
NR3 ∶= {S ⊂ R3󳈌 cardinality(S) = N}
Since it is a multiply-connected topological space, we follow the usual covering-space
construction to define the dynamics on its universal covering space and project it down
to NR3. Its universal covering space is, unsurprisingly, the simply-connected R3N . Let
Cov(R3N ,N R3) denote the covering group of the base space NR3 and its universal
covering space R3N . Given a map γ ∶ Cov(R3N ,N R3) → C, we define a wave function
1This argument, of course, is not intended as a mathematical demonstration, as we appeal to consid-
erations of naturalness and simplicity. But these assumptions are relatively weak, and they are guided
by strong intuitions of the practicing mathematical physicists. Even better, in our case of NR3, we can
prove the Unitarity Theorem—that the topological factor in the periodicity condition has to be a
character of the fundamental group.
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on this space: ψ ∶ R3N → C with the following periodicity condition associated with γ:
∀q̂ ∈ R3N ,∀σ ∈ Cov(R3N ,N R3),ψ(σq̂) = γσψ(q̂).
First, we show that if the wave function does not identically vanish (which is a
natural assumption), the topological factor γ is a representation. Given any σ1,σ1 ∈
Cov(R3N ,N R3):
γσ1σ2ψ(q̂) = ψ(σ1σ2q̂) = γσ1ψ(σ2q̂) = γσ1γσ2ψ(q̂).
Hence, γσ1σ2 = γσ1γσ2 . Therefore, γ is a structure-preserving map and a representation
of the covering group.
It is a well-known fact that the covering group is canonically isomorphic to the
fundamental group π1(Q, q), where Q is the base space. In our case, the fundamental
group π1(NR3, q) is SN , the group of permutations of N objects. It has only two
characters: (1) the trivial character γσ = 1 and (2) the alternating character γσ =
sign(σ) = 1 or − 1 depending on whether σ ∈ SN is an even or an odd permutation.
The former corresponds to the symmetric wave functions of bosons and the latter to the
anti-symmetric wave functions of fermions. If we can justify the use of the periodicity
condition and a ban on any other topological factors in the periodicity condition, we
would be able to rule out other types of particles such as anyons. This result would be
equivalent to the Symmetrization Postulate.
The periodicity condition is the most natural condition to require if we want a pro-
jectable velocity field given by the wave function on the covering space. The periodicity
condition implies that 󰑢ψ(σq̂) = γσσ∗󰑢ψ(q̂), where σ∗ is the push-forward action of σ




then it is related to other levels of the covering space:
v̂ψ(σq̂) = σ∗v̂ψ(q̂).
This makes v̂ projectable to a well-defined velocity field on the base space NR3:
vψ(q) = π∗v̂ψ(q̂),
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where q̂ is an arbitrary point in R3N that projects down to q via the projection map π.
Moreover, the periodicity condition is natural because it is preserved by the Schrödinger
evolution. Therefore, given an initial point q0 in the unordered configuration space
NR3,
we can choose an arbitrary point q̂0 in the ordered configuration space R3N that projects
to q0 via π, evolve q̂0 by the usual guidance equation in R3N until time t, and get the
final point qt = π(q̂t). The final point qt ∈N R3 is independent of the choice of the initial
q̂0 ∈ R3N .
We explain why it is crucial for the topological factor to be not only a representation
of the fundamental group but also unitary, as it is required to ensure that the probability
distribution is equivariant. Given the periodicity condition, we have
󳈌ψ(σq̂)󳈌2 = 󳈌γσ 󳈌2󳈌ψ(q̂)󳈌2.
To make 󳈌ψ(q̂)󳈌2 projectable to a function on NR3, we require that ∀σ ∈ SN , 󳈌γσ 󳈌2 = 1.
This is equivalent to γ being a character (a unitary representation) for the fundamental




= −󰑢 ⋅ (󳈌ψt󳈌2(q)vψt(q)).
Compare this with the transport equation for a probability density ρ on NR3:
∂ρt(q)
∂t
= −󰑢 ⋅ (ρt(q)vψt(q)).
Therefore, if ρt0(q) = 󳈌ψt0 󳈌2(q) at the initial time t0, then ρt(q) = 󳈌ψt󳈌2(q) at all later
times. We have arrived at equivariance.
The above argument works for the general case of multiply-connected spaces as well
as the particular case of NR3. In our case of NR3, we can prove the following simple
theorem that the topological factor γ must be a unitary representation, i.e. a group
character.
Unitarity Theorem Let σ ∈ Cov(R3N ,N R3), γ ∶ Cov(R3N ,N R3)→ C. If γσ ≠ 0 and
γσ1σ2 = γσ1γσ2 , ∀σ1,σ2 ∈ Cov(R3N ,N R3), then 󳈌γσ 󳈌 = 1.
Proof The fundamental group of NR3 is the permutation group SN , which has N !
elements. We obtain that γId = 1, because γσ = γ(σ∗Id) = γσγId and γσ ≠ 0. It is a
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general fact that in a finite group with k elements, every element σ satisfies σk = Id.
Therefore, rewriting γσ = Reiθ, we have 1e0i = 1 = γId = γσk = (γσ)k = Rkeikθ. So we
have: 󳈌γσ 󳈌 = 1, which makes γσ a unitary representation of the covering group, which is
a character of the fundamental group. ◻
Therefore, the periodicity condition associated with the topological factor:
∀q̂ ∈ R3N ,∀σ ∈ SN ,ψ(σq̂) = γσψ(q̂)
is a highly natural and simple condition that guarantees well-defined dynamics on NR3,
and the topological factors are the characters of the fundamental group.2 In the case
of NR3, the fundamental group is the permutation group of N objects: SN . Recall
that it has only two characters: (1) the trivial character γσ = 1 and (2) the alternating
character γσ = sign(σ) = 1 or − 1 depending on whether σ ∈ SN is an even or an odd
permutation. This leads to two possible dynamics corresponding to the symmetric and
the anti-symmetric wave functions (and no more):
(Bosons) ψB(xσ(1), ...,xσ(N)) = ψB(x1, ...,xN),
(Fermions) ψF (xσ(1), ...,xσ(N)) = (−1)σψF (x1, ...,xN),
where σ is a permutation of {1,2, ...,N} in the permutation group SN , (−1)σ denotes
the sign of σ, xi ∈ R3 for i = 1,2, ...,N. Therefore, we have arrived at the statement
of the Symmetrization Postulate for the 3-dimensional physical space. Interestingly,
the same argument would predict that there are more possibilities than fermions and
bosons if we go to a smaller space. For N identical particles in a 2-dimensional space,
there is the additional possibility of fractional statistics, corresponding to anyons.3
2In our particular case of NR3, we have the Unitarity Theorem to explain why the topological
factors have to be characters of the fundamental group. In the general case, even without such a
theorem there are still many good reasons why we should restrict the topological factors to the group
characters. See Dürr et al. (2007) §9 “The Character Quantization Principle.”
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